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The evolution of multi-agent system (MAS) presents new challenges in computer 
science and software engineering. A particularly challenging problem is the design of 
various forms of interaction among agents. Interaction may be aimed at enabling 
agents to coordinate their activities, cooperate to reach common objectives, or 
exchange resources to better achieve their individual objectives. This thesis is dealing 
with negotiation in e-commerce: a process through which multiple self-interested 
agents can reach agreement over the exchange of scarce resources.  
In particular, we present a fuzzy logic-based negotiation approach to automate multi-
issue bilateral negotiation in e-marketplaces. In such frameworks issues to negotiate 
on can be multiple, interrelated, and may not be fixed in advance. Therefore, we use 
fuzzy inference system to model relations among issues and to allow agents express 
their preferences on them. 
We focus on settings where agents have limited or uncertain information, ruling them 
out from making optimal decisions. Since agents make decisions based on particular 
underlying reasons, namely their interests, beliefs then applying logic (by using fuzzy 
logic) over these reasons can enable agents to refine their decisions and consequently 
reach better agreements. I refer to this form of negotiation as: Fuzzy logic based 
negotiation in e-commerce. 
The contributions of the thesis begin with the use of fuzzy logic to design a reasoning 
model through which negotiation tactics and strategy are expressed throughout the 
process of negotiation. Then, an exploration of the differences between this approach 
and the more traditional bargaining-based approaches is presented. Strategic issues 
are then explored and a methodology for designing negotiation strategies is 






Evolusi sistem multi-agent (MAS) menyajikan cabaran baru dalam ilmu komputer 
dan kejuruteraan perisian. Masalah khususnya mencabar adalah rekaan pelbagai 
bentuk interaksi antar agen. Interaksi mungkin bertujuan untuk membolehkan agen 
untuk menyelaraskan kegiatan mereka, bekerja sama untuk mencapai tujuan bersama, 
atau sumber-sumber daya pertukaran yang lebih baik mencapai matlamat masing-
masing. Penyelidikan ini berkaitan dengan perundingan dalam e-dagang: proses 
melalui mana agen kepentingan sendiri beberapa dapat mencapai kesepakatan atas 
pertukaran sumber daya yang langka. Secara khusus, kami menyajikan pendekatan 
perundingan berasaskan logik fuzzy untuk mengotomatisasi perundingan multi-isu 
bilateral dalam e-marketplaces. Dalam isu-isu seperti rangka kerja untuk berunding di 
dapat beberapa, saling berkaitan, dan mungkin tidak ditetapkan sebelumnya. Oleh 
kerana itu, kami menggunakan sistem inferensi fuzzy untuk model hubungan antara 
isu-isu dan untuk membolehkan agen mengekspresikan keutamaan mereka pada 
mereka. Kami fokus pada tatacara di mana agen mempunyai maklumat yang terhad 
atau tidak pasti, berkuasa mereka dari membuat keputusan yang optimum. Sejak agen 
membuat keputusan berdasarkan alasan yang mendasari tertentu, iaitu kepentingan 
mereka, keyakinan kemudian menerapkan logik (dengan menggunakan logik fuzzy) 
atas alasan-alasan ini boleh memungkinkan agen untuk memperbaiki keputusan 
mereka dan akibatnya mencapai kesepakatan yang lebih baik. Saya lihat bentuk 
perundingan sebagai: Logik Fuzzy berasaskan rundingan dalam e-dagang. 
Sumbangan tesis bermula dengan menggunakan logik fuzzy untuk merancang sebuah 
model penalaran melalui perundingan taktik dan strategi disajikan selama proses 
perundingan. Kemudian, sebuah eksplorasi perbezaan antara pendekatan ini dan 
pendekatan berasaskan tawar-menawar yang lebih tradisional disajikan. Isu strategik 
ini kemudian dieksplorasi dan metodologi untuk merancang strategi perundingan 
dibangunkan. Akhirnya, pelaksanaan rangka disimulasikan menggunakan toolbox 
MATLAB.   
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1.1 Introduction  
With the advancement of internet technology, business transactions have grown 
rapidly over the last couple of decade. Today, as the world witnesses growing 
businesses going online, there has been a tendency about shifting to a complete or 
automated type of online business activities. Electronic commerce provides 
efficiency, cost savings, productivity to many business entities. The ongoing 
improvements in internet technology through reliability, security, higher seeds 
(broadband) and cheaper costs, has permitted e-business to grow rapidly over the web. 
E business is now globally flourishing and moving with a remarkable trend. E-
business is helping transform business into a network structure thus providing greater 
value for their products, less costs and access to their customers. E-business brings 
production and consumption closer and enterprises gain a wider and competitive 
market while consumers gain more choices and more personalized services [33]. 
As of today, one of the most significant parts of e-business that businesses have 
not paid attention and focus to is the automation of negotiation in e-business. That is 
how to completely automate e-business in a way one can be able to negotiate a deal 
with a counterpart. There is a need for a more sophisticated automated negotiation in 
e-business. Negotiation is a critical activity in business transactions. Defined as an 
interactive process, “negotiation” aims to achieve a mutually beneficial deal for the 
seller and buyer [31]. Negotiations can be done mutually in e-business, for example 
using emails, but it is not timely and cost effective. There is a need for automated 
negotiation process using agent technology to negotiate a solution autonomously for a 
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more efficient and objective result. 
Agents are considered to be the new trend of software system and object oriented 
computing. Currently, they have been used for information retrieval and for offering 
recommendations such as finding product information, comparing product prices, and 
offering suggestions on product and services based on customer’s interest and 
preferences [27]. According to Zambonelli and Parunak [12], there exist four main 
characteristics that stand between the future software systems from traditional ones: 
1. environment: this designates the context of an environment which can be 
influenced or being influenced by; 
2. Openness: this is about the dynamism and decision power a software can 
acquire 
3. Locality in Control: this characteristic represents the autonomist and proactive 
loci control within software system component.  
4. Locality in interaction: regardless of full connectivity, software system still 
depends on local (geographical or regional) interaction. 
These characteristics have drawn ways for agents to possess a new paradigm – an 
agent paradigm which offers a powerful set of metaphors, concepts and techniques for 
conceptualizing, designing, implementing and verifying complex distributed systems 
[46]. An agent is viewed as an encapsulated computer system that is situated in an 
environment and is capable of flexible, autonomous action in order to meet its design 
objectives [32]. Applications of agent technology have ranged from electronic trading 
and distributed business process management, to air-traffic and industrial control, to 
health care and patient monitoring, to gaming and interactive entertainment [32; 35].  
Agents are highly customizable and personalization enhances interactivity. Agents 
also interact with other agents to achieve mutually agreeable terms and conditions of a 
business transaction. However, different types of interaction mechanisms suit 
different types of environments and applications. Agents are able to and can facilitate 
information exchange, coordinate activities in a coherent manner, collaborate with 
other agents to achieve a common goal, and so on. One such type of interaction that is 
gaining increasing prominence in the agent community is negotiation. The following 
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definition of negotiation, adapted from work on the philosophy of argumentation by 
[8] suits the objective:  
Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents, with conflicting 
interests and a desire to cooperate try to come to a mutually acceptable 
agreement on the division of scarce resources. 
Let us have the following illustration in figure1.1 below  
 
Figure.1 1: Automated Negotiation Scenario 
The above figure depicts a software agent (Buyer agent) acting on behalf of a 
manufacturer in negotiation with various supplier agents (SA), in order to secure the 
delivery of various components. In this scenario, the negotiation mechanism involves 
allocating money and commodities (goods/service). Each party aims at making more 
money, and hence the different commodities suppliers compete over contracts with 
the buyer. Typical issues that arise in this situation include: What trading mechanism 
should agents use? What negotiation protocol to use? What happens if a supplier fails 
to delivery on time, or has produced an excess supply? Do we need some measure of 
the reliability of different suppliers, and how do we use such measure in making 
decisions about allocation? And so on. 
Beyond these concerned and as an answer to them, there are properties of which 
designers of negotiation mechanisms aim at. Here are the list of some properties 
adapted from the work of Rosenschein and Zlotkin [21]: 
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1. Simplicity: A mechanism property that asks for less computational processing 
and communication overhead. 
2. Efficiency: an efficient mechanism which produces good outcome is preferred. 
3. Decentralization: decentralization is one of these properties that are also 
acceptable. 
4. Symmetry: the mechanism should not be biased for or against some agent 
whatever the condition. 
5. Stability: a stability is much preferred; at least agent won’t have the incentive 
of deviation from some agreed upon strategy or set of strategy. And above them all; 
6. Flexibility: a mechanism should be flexible in handling situation where there 
is lack of complete and private information in relation to their own decisions and 
preferences. 
Various interaction and decision mechanisms for automated negotiation have been 
proposed and studied. Frameworks for automated negotiation have been studied 
analytically using game-theoretic techniques [21; 49] and logic- based techniques 
[32], as well as experimentally by programming and testing actual systems [38; 47; 
46]. These negotiation frameworks are mainly based on the exchange of offers such as 
a bid in an English Auction is an example of an offer. Analytical and empirical 
techniques have helped produce mechanisms that satisfy the properties discussed 
above to varying degrees. However, the flexibility property has only begun to receive 
attention in the multi-agent community. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
Most frameworks [49; 38; 46; 35] for automated negotiation are often based on the 
assumption that agents have complete, pre-set and fixed preferences over negotiation 
outcomes, as well as a complete awareness of the space of possible outcomes. This 
means that agents are in advance aware of what they need and how different deals 
they can satisfy. And all that is needed is to jointly find a deal that is satisfactory 
enough for all parties. If that is so, it means simply that negotiation using agents 
represents the exchange of suggested potential deals, which are then evaluated against 
the predetermined preferences until an agreement is reached. However, agent 
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flexibility suggests otherwise. Limited, uncertain or false information, due to 
imperfect sensing of the environment or due to the lack of time or computational 
resources needed to fully process information are not going to affect or influence (in a 
deviating manner) a well sound flexible negotiation agent mechanism. Beside, of the 
various researches done in this area, many of them (33, 46, 51, 52) based their 
evaluation mechanism in a complete mathematical set – a Boolean kind of 
programming. That means it is either zero or one. Hence, there exists a lot of numbers 
between zero and one which these mechanisms designers do not take into 
consideration. For instance, an agent might be programmed to carry on the purchase 
of a black Gen2 car. As such any Gen 2 car which is not black is not acceptable and 
no possible deal is going to happen within this framework. Although the buyer’s 
preference is for a black car, the buyer may wish to relax this constraint under certain 
circumstances. Again, in this sense, not only the notion of flexibility is lost but also 
efficiency is made ineffective.  
Against this background, we are proposing a negotiation mechanism that is based 
on fuzzy logic. By fuzzy, we mean to unlock the deadlock between zero and one, 
making the negotiation decision paradigm flows – be flexible. A comprehensive 
reasoning model anticipates the making of a human like negotiation mechanism. 
1.3. Objectives and contribution 
To alleviate much of today’s problems, such as high inefficiency, subjectivity, etc., 
inherent in human negotiations, this research begins in an attempt to answer the 
following question: 
How can we design an agent capable of negotiating effectively, by incorporating 
the notion of fuzzy logic throughout the process of negotiation – from generating 
offers, evaluating them and make decision?  
This thesis revolves around answering this question. In fact, I contend that 
flexibility in choices (option available for a deal) through fuzziness can enable agents 
to reach the desired outcome.  
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To this end, I first present the generic framework for automated negotiation. I then 
introduce the dawn of fuzzy logic in negotiation. Finally, I present a comprehensive 
reasoning model based on fuzzy expert system, which allows agent to generate offers 
and counter offers, evaluate incoming offers and make decision with regard to the 
outcome of the negotiation.  
Primarily, my work is restrained to a problem in negotiation in e-commerce, 
specifically: the design of negotiation mechanism capable of resolving conflicts over 
resources. Though there are concepts in this thesis drawn from other theories such as 
game theory, the philosophy of argumentation, and so on; I do not - and do not claim 
to - make a contribution to these areas. In fact the main concept of modeling presented 
in this thesis is to express the agents’ negotiation tactics as fuzzy rules so that a more 
promising negotiation interaction can be made. 
As such, the objectives of my research are: 
1. To propose a negotiation mechanism based on fuzzy logic. 
2. To design a reasoning model capable of handling fuzzy and qualitative 
preferences 
1.4.Overview of thesis 
This thesis is structured into the following chapters: 
 Chapter 1 covers the introduction, problem statement, and objective and 
contribution. 
 Chapter 2 presents a review of related literature on negotiation approaches; 
which has been already done. This chapter examines the general concept of 
these methods and their drawback.  
 Chapter 3 covers the methodology of the research that will be used as 
framework. It is divided into two parts. The first part gives an overview of 
fuzzy logic and the second part highlights how fuzzy logic negotiation is to be 
conducted.  
 Chapter 4 proposes our negotiation model using fuzzy logic and 
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 Chapter 5 discusses the simulation and results of the proposed model. 













This chapter discusses and analyzes existing research on automated negotiation; 
particularly fuzzy logic negotiation. It first gives a brief insight on negotiation in 
general and what has been done so far in the area. In particular, this chapter discusses 
and reviews negotiation using fuzzy logic. 
2.2 Overview of the Negotiation 
Negotiation as defined from the previous chapter suggests that the need for an 
automation of negotiation arises only when agents have conflicting objectives and a 
desire to cooperate. Agents typically conflict over issues which are to be resolved 
through negotiation. These issues range from goods, services, delivery, price, quality 
and so on.  
Numerous theories have been proposed and studied in the area of automation of 
negotiation in MAS. Theses researches include: game-theory based bargaining [14, 
10, 11]; Heuristic-based approaches [38, 46, 35]; and Multi-attribute decision theory 
[44]. Thus, the remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
presents and discusses concepts essential to understanding the automated negotiation 
problem; followed by discussion and criticism of game-theory bargaining in section 
2.3. Heuristic based approaches discussion and critics in section 2.4 and fuzzy logic 
based approaches followed by multi-attribute decision making theory in section 
2.5.The chapter finally ends with summary and discussion in section 2.6. 
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2.3 Fundamental Concept 
This section is dedicated to discussing some fundamental concept used in the 
automated negotiation literature more precisely. 
2.3.1 The Negotiation Space Agreement 
Negotiation as it happened, aims at resolving issues over which agents have 
conflicting interest. That is allocating resources that are acceptable to both parties. In 
this sense, negotiation can be seen as a “distributed search through a space of 
Potential agreements” [3, 4, 51]. There are, however, different ways of characterizing 
this particular agreement space. The space, in a way, can be seen as a set of deals Ώ = 
{Ώ1… Ώn} where n is the size of the search space. 
Another way of characterizing the search space is in terms of atomic program 
which is conceived as a combination of actions that can change the state of the world. 
In this characterization, agreement is defined as a set of attributes A1, . . ., An where 
each attribute Ai can take a set of value ܽ௜,ଵ ,ܽ௜,ଶ … , ܽ௜,௠ . for illustration purpose the 
following example is to take place. 
 Example 1. Let BA represents a buyer agent and SA, a seller agent, 
negotiating over an issue which is Hand phone. The issue to be resolved has ‘brand’ 
and ‘price’ as attribute. Suppose the attribute brand is either ‘Nokia’ or “Samsung” 
and the price can take an integer value between 1 and $700. Therefore, every 
combination of brand/price noted as (brand, price) such as (Nokia, $500) or 
(Samsung, $200) is a deal. Hence the size of possible deals is 2 x 700 = 1400. This 
means, since we have two brands (m1=2) and the respective value (m2 =700), then the 
possible deal m1m2 is 2 x 700. 
Referring to the above example, we can note that using a set of attribute over a 
range of a domain size means that as the number of attribute n and the number of 
possible values m1 increases, accordingly the agreement space increases. This makes 
it complex and infeasible to consider every possible set of agreement when we deal 
with a very large space of possible deal. An ideal example would be when we have a 
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negotiation mechanism, which uses time constraints. Normally, a negotiation 
mechanism using time constraints is lock down between a specific time frame within 
which the agent has to conclude a deal or else refrain from the negotiation. Therefore, 
when an agent has a very large combination of deal, it will obviously take more time 
to go through than the originally assigned time frame.  
Going back to example 1, we can see that the combination (Nokia, $500) is easily 
understood and interpreted as: the Nokia hand phone is to be given to the buyer in 
exchange for $500. However, this may not be the case if we were to use explicit 
specification for agents are themselves associated with the allocation. 
Example 2.   Let say a university authority assigning different courses to different 
lecturers, need to explicitly detail or specify which lecturer should take which subject 
and so on. Suppose, we have three subjects to be assigned to two lecturers; therefore 
there will be a need to specify which subject goes to whom. Possible combination of 
this scenario, however, may be represented as follows: (Lecrturer1, (course1, 
course2)) and (Lecturer2, course3). 
Again, as we noticed, no matter explicit or implicit a scenario might be, the space 
of possible deals still increases when allocation increases. Nevertheless, it is obvious 
and fundamental to first somehow characterize the set of possible allocation and its 
domain. 
2.3.2 Negotiation Mechanism 
The ideal about the automation of negotiation is that, where everything is constant, 
agent must find or realize the better possible deal or outcome.  To do that agents 
require certain mechanism or strategy in which rules of encounter are specified. An 
example of this type of agent using rules of encounter would be an auction place 
where there are players as bidders (buyers) and a seller, a person to whom is entrusted 
the selling of a property. 
Another example of mechanism would be bargaining; where two agents exchange 
offers until an agreement is reached. 
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Each mechanism presents different properties depending on what the agent is to 
achieve. Nevertheless, certainly, there are number of features which any mechanisms 






2.4 Game – Theoretic Approach to Negotiation 
This section discusses game theoretic approach to negotiation followed by the 
limitation of this specific approach. 
2.4.1 Overview of Game Theoretic approach 
As in [1], a game theory is a branch of economics in which strategic interactions 
between self-interested economic agents are studied. Game theory is rooted from the 
work of von Neuman and Morgenstern [25] and has been extensively used to study 
and engineer interaction between self-interested computational agents [49, 32]. It is 
also widely acknowledged to provide a useful set of tools for the design of Multi-
agents architecture. 
There exist two main core game theory classified as cooperative and non-
cooperative. The difference in these two branches is mainly in how they formalize 
interdependence among the players.  
 Non cooperative game theory: in this theory, a game is a detailed model of all the 
moves   available to the players, whereas 
 Cooperative theory abstracts away from this level of detail, and describes only the 
outcomes that result when players come together in different combinations. 
Since the non-cooperative game theory is the one widely used, therefore any 
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mention of game theory throughout this section will refer to the non-cooperative game 
theory. For its own, The non-cooperative game theory includes tools for conducting 
two types of analysis: 
 Optimal behavior analysis of individuals or organizations; and 
 Analysing how to design optimal mechanisms, given that agents behave 
strategically. 
2.4.1.1 Behavior analysis concept 
The behavior analysis concept revolves around a game in which each player is 
presented by a set of alternative actions (choices or strategies) and given to some rules 
with set of actions available and the outcome of the encounter. 
The most popular example of game theory is the so-called prisoner’s dilemma [4, 
41]. In the so-called prisoner’s dilemma game, the players are considered to be two 
criminals held by the police and being interrogated in two separate rooms. Each 
criminal has to give individual testimony, without being influenced by the other, 
wherein both fates are analyzed. Each player has the option to confess or not to 
confess. Should neither of the suspect confesses, then both of them go free and split 
the proceeds of their crime; each one of them receiving a certain utility. However, if 
one confesses and testifies against the other, then he only will be set free and get the 
entire proceeds, while the other goes to jail and get nothing. Nevertheless, should both 
of them confess, they are entitled to reduced term and of course getting certain utility. 
Example 3: we present the above-mentioned concept in a matrix representation 
table below. This table details the action and outcome of the game. The first row 
shows the actions available to player 1, while the first column shows actions available 
to player 2. The numbers in the upper right hand of each cell represent the utility (or 
payoff) received by player 1 from that action combination, while the bottom left 




Table 2.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Not Confess Confess 
Not Confess                 8 
8 




                      0 
16 
                     4 
4 
Given the above prisoner’s dilemma matrix representation, the following analysis is 
due to help and understand the optimal behavior analysis of the game theory.  
Assume that player 1 knows the set of actions available to him and to player 2, 
and that player 1 also has complete information about the payoffs in the matrix. 
Player 1 reasons strategically as follows: suppose player 2 does not confess! In this 
case, I would rather confess, because I would get a utility of 16 (compared to 8 for not 
confessing). Suppose, instead, that player 2 confesses, then I would also rather 
confess, because I get a utility of 4 (compared to 0 for not confessing). Hence, for 
every possible action of player 2, player 1 is better off confessing. For player 1, 
confession is the dominant strategy, because it got nothing to lose. The exact same 
analysis can be followed from the point of view of player 2, leading to a dominant 
strategy to confess. As a result of both agents confessing, they will get a payoff of 4 
each. Note that in this case, both agents are worse off than they would be if they both 
did not confess (in which case they would receive a utility of 8 each). In other words, 
even though the outcome resulting from mutual no confession strictly dominates the 
outcome resulting from mutual confession, rational agent behavior will lead to the 
latter. 
This optimal behavior analysis of the game leads us to understand that the notion 
of “equilibrium” constitute a fundamental or core concept for game theory. An ideal 
type of equilibrium would be the so-called Nash equilibrium, where no player has an 
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incentive to deviate from a particular strategy, given that other players stick to their 
strategies. 
2.4.1.2 Design analysis mechanism 
The concept of mechanism design is meant for resource allocation mechanism to be 
designed in such a way that each agent behavior is directed toward maximizing its 
utility. 
The popular mechanisms used are the ones using notions of dominant behavior 
and equilibrium. An example of desired mechanism properties is incentive 
compatibility. A mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if, under that 
mechanism, the dominant strategy for all agents is to tell the truth about their 
preferences (often referred to as their types). This is a powerful concept, since by 
guaranteeing incentive compatibility; mechanism designers make sure agents cannot 
strategically manipulate the outcome by lying about their types. This property is an 
example of the stability requirement mentioned earlier in section 2.2.3. In economics, 
mechanism design principles are used to design various negotiation mechanisms, 
ranging from auctions, to voting, to bilateral bargaining [48]. 
2.4.2 Game Theory for Automated Negotiation 
Game theory is known for providing a very powerful and useful tool for studying and 
engineering strategic interaction among self-interested computational agents in 
general, and to automated negotiation in particular [50]. As discussed earlier on, game 
theory can be applied to study and engineer both the strategies as well as the 
mechanism. The field of computational mechanism design [18] uses mechanism 
design techniques in order to construct mechanisms for allocating resources in multi-
agent systems. Some of the most influential uses of game theory in studying 
automated negotiation. 
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2.4.2.1 A Domain Theory for Automated Negotiation 
The use of mechanism design to automated negotiation is mainly and thoroughly used 
in the work of Rosenschein and Zlotkin [21]. In their work, they came out with a 
domain theory for automated negotiation distinguishing three different domains:  
1) Task-oriented domains: this domain deals with the decision of tasks to 
execute; the utility function associated with different task allocations; and the 
individual evaluation of agent for the cost of the task to be executed. Here the utility 
function is determined in terms of cost associated with different tasks. 
2) State-oriented domains: this domain is about what state agents will achieve; 
the utility function is measured in terms of preference over states that result from 
different deals; each agent tries to get to a more preferable state to itself. 
3) Worth-oriented domains: domains involving a joint decision about what goals 
to achieve; the utility function is measured in terms of the number of goals each deal 
achieves; each agent tries to achieve as many goals as possible.  
Rosenschein and Zlotkin [21] emphasize on the study of agent strategies in 
different domains and under different mechanisms. They derived and design the agent 
strategies mainly from concepts of game theory and mechanism design theory. Their 
goal is to design a mechanism that produces an outcome based on the information 
agents reveal about them. The authors show that, in certain situations, an agent can 
benefit from strategic manipulation, for example by lying about the tasks it has to 
perform or about its preferences over states. This analysis was then used in order to 
design incentive compatible mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that force agents to be 
truthful. However, such mechanisms are restricted by certain conditions. For example, 
the authors were able to construct incentive compatible mechanisms when agents 
have incomplete information about each other's preferences over states, but not when 
they have incomplete information about each other's goals.3. Worth-oriented 
domains: domains involving a joint decision about what goals. 
2.4.2.2 Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions 
Sandholm [49] used game-theoretic techniques in order to construct eMediator, an 
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electronic commerce server that uses algorithmic and game-theoretic techniques to 
allocate resources among multiple agents. eMediator includes the eAuctionHouse, a 
configurable auction server that can handle a number of combinatorial auctions and 
exchanges; and the eCommitter, a contract optimiser that determines the optimal 
contract price and decommitting penalties for the different parties, taking into account 
that agents may decommit strategically. The author is concerned with achieving 
optimal outcomes using a mechanism that ensures agents do not deviate from the 
desired strategies. In related work, Sandholm [48] presents an algorithm for optimal 
winner determination in combinatorial auctions (auctions where bidders can bid on 
combinations of items). Conitzer and Sandholm [50] explore viewing the mechanism 
design problem itself as a computational problem, and present algorithms that produce 
preference aggregation mechanisms at run-time, given a particular setting. 
2.4.3 Limitations of Game Theory 
An adequate evaluation of game theory is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I 
focus my discussion on issues relevant to automated negotiation, and particularly to 
the topic of this thesis. 
In game-theoretic analysis, researchers usually attempt to determine the optimal 
strategy by analysing the interaction as a game between identical participants, and 
seeking its equilibrium [23, 29, 49,]. The strategy determined by these methods can 
sometimes be made to be optimal for a participant, given the game rules, the assumed 
payoffs, and the goals of the participants. Assuming further that participants behave 
according to the assumptions of rational-choice theory [36], then this approach can 
guide the design of the interaction mechanism itself, and thus force such agents to 
behave in certain ways [37]. 
Classical game theory assumes, among other things, that agents: 
1) Have unbounded computational resources, 
2) Have complete knowledge of the outcome space, and 
3) Are optimisers of utility in the sense of rational-choice theory 
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From a computational perspective, these assumptions imply unrealistic 
assumptions about the negotiating software agents. The first assumption implies that 
no computation or communication cost is incurred in order to reach a deal. In most 
realistic computational environments, however, this assumption fails due to the 
limited processing and communication capabilities of information systems. The size 
of the set of possible deals grows exponentially with the number of attributes and 
attributes values. Calculating and evaluating all of these may require more time and 
computation than can be afforded. Similarly, in a bargaining encounter, exchanging 
every possible offer may be impractical, given time and communication bandwidth 
limitations. Classical game-theoretic models do not provide a way to account for these 
costs and study their impact on strategic decisions. 
The second assumption implies that not only does the software agent have 
unbounded computational resources to evaluate every possible resource allocation, 
but it also has all preference information needed to perform such evaluation. In many 
domains, however, it may be impractical for the user to specify its complete 
preference information to the agent. 
The third assumption implies that agents always make decisions that optimise 
their utility. Game theory requires this because an agent must first reason about the 
“optimal strategy of the opponent before deducing the best response to that strategy. 
However, software agents may be resource-constrained (as discussed above), 
altruistic, malicious, or simply badly-coded, so that participant behaviour may not 
conform to the assumptions of rational choice theory. Hence, if game theory's 
predictions are inaccurate, its prescriptive advice becomes unreliable. 
Game theory can also be critiqued from a “software-engineering” point of view. 
Game theory is normative since it is concerned with what constitutes an optimal 
decision given a game description. Hence, classical game theory has nothing to say 
about how to implement agents that reason optimally. It is worth pointing out that an 
emerging sub-area of game theory, termed evolutionary game theory [38], is 
concerned with some of the limitations discussed above. Evolutionary game theory 
relaxes the assumption of unbounded rationality. Instead of calculating optimal 
strategies, games are played repeatedly and strategies are tested through a trial-and-
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error learning process in which players gradually discover that some strategies work 
better than others. However, other assumptions, such as the availability of a 
preference valuation function, still hold. Another limitation is the modelling of 
bounded rationality” by explicitly capturing elements of the process of choice, such as 
limited memory, limited knowledge, approximate preferences (that ignore minor 
difference between options) etc. [2, 39]. These frameworks are primarily aimed at 
producing models that better explain and predict human behaviour in real economic 
and social scenarios. Their insight into the building of multi-agent systems requires 
further exploration and is relevant to heuristic approaches discussed in the next 
section. 
2.5 Heuristic Based Approach 
When agent designers relax some of the assumptions of game theory, particularly 
regarding unbounded rationality, they immediately fall outside the region of 
predictability of classical game-theory. This implies that analytical results (e.g. about 
optimal strategies) become hard to achieve. Instead, approximate strategies (or 
heuristics) must be devised. Heuristics are rules of thumb that produce good enough 
(rather than optimal) outcomes. For heuristic approaches, experimentation through 
simulation becomes a more viable option for studying the properties of different 
strategies. The support for a particular heuristic is usually based on empirical testing 
and evaluation in comparison with other heuristics [7, 17, 46; 47]. In general, these 
methods offer approximations to the decisions made according to game-theoretic 
studies. The heuristic approach has been applied both to bargaining mechanisms as 
well as auction-based mechanisms. In the next section, I survey some major 
frameworks in each category. 
2.5.1 Heuristics for Bargaining 
A number of heuristic methods have been employed in a service-oriented negotiation 
framework presented by Faratin, Sierra and Jennings in a number of papers [see 36, 
37, 38]. In this framework, different heuristic decision functions are used for 
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evaluating and generating offers in multi-attribute negotiation [7]. Instead of 
exploring all possible deals, agents exchange offers based on heuristic functions that 
depend on time deadlines and resource availability. Moreover, in order to improve the 
convergence to a deal, the authors present a method that enables an agent to generate 
offers that are “similar” to previous offers made by its negotiation counterpart [42] 
(where, “similarity” representation is based on fuzzy-logic techniques [43]). The 
intuition is that such offers are more likely to be accepted by the counterpart. 
Kowalczyk and Bui [42] present a negotiation model with decision procedures 
based on distributed constraint satisfaction [53]. This enables agents to use heuristics 
used in the constraint satisfaction literature in order to improve the process of 
generating and evaluating offers. This framework was later extended to allow for 
multiple concurrent negotiations [45] and to accommodate fuzzy (as opposed to 
“crisp”) constraints [46]. The idea of using fuzzy constraint satisfaction is further 
investigated by Luo et al. [47]. 
Kraus [48] presents a negotiation framework based on Rubinstein's model for 
alternating offers [49]. The framework has been used to solve data allocation, 
resource allocation and task distribution problems, and was verified via empirical 
simulation and (to a certain extent) related analytically to game-theoretic concepts. In 
related work, Fatima et al. [46; 16; 5] studied the influence of information and time 
constraints on the negotiation equilibrium in a particular heuristic model.  
2.5.1.1 The Trading Agent Competition 
Another example of the use of heuristics in negotiation is the Trading Agent 
Competition (TAC): an annual competition, which involves multiple competing 
agents bidding in simultaneous auctions. I discuss TAC-02 as an example.  
Eight agents participated in each TAC-02 game. Each agent performed the role of 
a travel agent attempting to provide booking for eight clients travelling from 
TACtown to Tampa and back during a five-day period. Each client was characterised 
by a random set of preferences for arrival and departure dates, hotels and 
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entertainment tickets. Utility was gained by purchasing a complete package and was 
calculated based on comparison with the corresponding client's preferences. Package 
constituents were sold in separate simultaneous auctions, each with certain price 
dynamics. Airline tickets were sold in single round continuous auctions with biased 
random pricing that was more likely to increase. Hotel bookings were sold in 
ascending English auctions clearing every minute, while entertainment tickets were 
traded in continuous double auctions. The score of an agent was the difference 
between the total utility gained for its clients and the agent's expenditure. 
TAC represents a real challenge for automated negotiation, where game-theoretic 
techniques fail. This is mainly due to the complexity of the problem and the time 
limitations. Agents participate in 28 different auctions over a period of 12 minutes. 
Each agent has to solve a combinatorial assignment problem, where goods must be 
packaged into bundles. Moreover, agents' bidding behaviour must be strategic, taking 
into account the strategies of other agents in order to decide when to buy and how 
much to bid. A consequence of these complications is that `there is no known way to 
compute the best course of action' [50]. TAC-02 participants used techniques ranging 
from Linear Programming for finding optimal bundles, to Machine Learning for 
modelling other agents' behaviours, to Genetic Algorithms for evolving adaptive 
strategies. 
2.5.2 Limitations of Heuristic Approaches 
Heuristic methods do indeed overcome many of the shortcomings of game-theoretic 
approaches. However, they also have a number of disadvantages [25]. 
Firstly, the models often lead to outcomes that are sub-optimal because they adopt 
an approximate notion of rationality and because they do not examine the full space of 
possible outcomes. And secondly, it is very difficult to predict precisely how the 
system and the constituent agents will behave. Consequently, the models need 
extensive evaluation through simulations and empirical analysis. 
Another limitation of heuristic approaches is that, like game-theoretic approaches, 
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they assume that agents know what they want. In other words, agents have a precise 
and correct way of calculating the quality of the negotiation outcome (usually using 
numerical utility functions). As I shall argue in depth in the following section, this 
requirement cannot always be satisfied, in which case alternative techniques would be 
needed. 
2.6 Fuzzy Logic based Approaches to Negotiation 
The core challenge facing the theory of negotiation model stated above is their ability 
to handle qualitative negotiation preferences. In the following paragraphs I will argue 
that existing game-theoretic, heuristic approaches and auction based negotiation do 
not satisfy those properties. Then, I will show how an emerging family of negotiation 
frameworks, based on the notion of fuzzy logic has the potential to overcome this 
limitation. Such frameworks have been termed negotiation using fuzzy logic 
frameworks. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that couple of researches have been 
done in negotiation using the notion of fuzzy logic as in [33, 53, and 16]. Although 
they use different fuzzy techniques, in most part it leads to a common purpose. 
 
In [33] the authors have raised the issue of autonomous negotiation and propose a 
fuzzy logic based bidding strategy for autonomous agents in continuous double 
actions. While [53] in his model expresses the idea of making trade offs (relaxing on 
an attribute), M.He and al. structures their modelling based on auctioning. They argue 
that the seller and buyer constitute the continuous double actions or CDAs within 
which negotiation is to take place. Therefore, negotiation among them is like an 
auction in a different environment. It is always give and take. However auction based 
theory lacks to some extent the dynamism of producing an ideal negotiation. In the 
auction based theory, preferences of both buyer and seller are known and 
predetermined, making it easy for other party to determine one’s moves. 
Meanwhile, H. Al-Ashmaway and al [16] in their paper expressed the importance 
of incorporating fuzzy logic to the automation of negotiation in an effort to deal with 
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ambiguities in the negotiation. They proposed a reasoning model just to try to 
determine the degree to which the negotiating agent is satisfied with an incoming 
offer while the concession rate which constitutes the ratio that allows calculating the 
next offer is applied using heuristic based theory. Nevertheless, the satisfaction degree 
calculated using fuzzy logic is merely used for its specific purpose and does not 
contribute any part in determining the concession rate which constitutes the main 
output of the negotiation. it could therefore be said that the model lacks to stand for its 
expectation to be a fuzzy logic based negotiation. The trade-off or the main factor of 
the negotiation model proposed is yet based on time, resource or imitation technique 
to allow the flow of offer and counter offer. 
Another category of negotiation theory is the multi-attribute decision making 
theory. Pei-you and Yi-Ling [52] have worked in this type of theory. The latter is 
based on multi-criteria decision making [53]. In [53], the main idea is on how to 
generate weight. The author provides the model to deal with problem of ranking and 
site selection. The paper again is destined to deal with a problem of quantitative 
nature and as it is based on concept of accurate measure and crisp evaluation. 
Through this footstep, Pei-you and Yi-Ling have proposed a negotiation model based 
on uncertainty multi-attribute decision making. Their main objective is to develop a 
decision making operator based on the application of vague mathematics to evaluate 
negotiator’s preference for different attribute. In the process fuzzy membership and 
Bayesian learning theory is to be the methodology. However, conceptually, their 
model is as same as [53, 16] but different approach used. One can note that the fuzzy 
membership incorporated is, if not at all, defined. Their paper is more tied and 
focused on Bayesian learning mechanism and rather the combination of it with fuzzy 
membership. Thus, the effect or incorporation of fuzzy logic here is inexistent.  
Either case (whether paper [33, 53, 16 or 7]) their application of fuzzy logic is 
partial and is only involved where vague or uncertain attributes are concerned. Pei-
you and Yi-ling in particular have combine fuzzy membership with Bayesian learning 
mechanism to determine the preference of either buyer or seller on a particular 
attribute or issue; whereas [53, 16] have used fuzzy to determine the satisfaction 
degree of either buyer or seller on a particular offer.  
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2.7 A Closer Look at the existing Models 
The existing approaches to automated negotiation mostly assume that agents' utilities 
or preferences are completely characterised prior to the interaction. Thus, an agent is 
assumed to have a mechanism by which it can assess and compare any two proposals. 
This may be easy, for example, when the utility of the negotiation object is defined in 
terms of a monetary value. However, in more complex negotiation situations, such as 
trade union negotiations, agents may well have incomplete information, which limits 
this capability. Thus, agents might: 
 lack some of the information relevant to making a comparison between two 
potential    proposals and,  
 have limited resources preventing them from acquiring such information,   
 have the information, but lack the time needed to process it in order to make 
the comparison,  
 have inconsistent or uncertain beliefs about the environment, 
 have unformed or undetermined preferences (e.g. about products new to 
them), or 
 have incoherent preferences. 
The situations described above do exist in the human negotiation world (bearing 
in mind that the objective of this thesis is to design a human like negotiation). For 
example, consumers form their preferences based on information available to them. 
They acquire and modify their preferences as a result of interaction with the 
environment and other consumers [26]. Advertising capitalises on this idea, and can 
be seen a process of `argumentation' in which marketers attempt to persuade 
consumers to change their preferences among different products [13]. 
Allowing flexibility in negotiation increase both buyer and seller interest to 
perform an action using agent. Designing a human like is an important part of a sound 
negotiation. If that is so, a reasonable question to ask is: can computational agents be 
able to deal with common sense that human deal with during negotiation? For existing 
frameworks, the answer is mostly No for the following reasons: 
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 In most game-theoretic and heuristic models, agents exchange proposals (i.e. 
potential agreements or potential deals). This, for example, can be a promise 
to purchase a good at a specified price in an English auction, a value 
assignment to multiple attributes in a multi-dimensional auction [13], or an 
alternate offer in a bargaining encounter [5]. Agents are not allowed to 
exchange any additional information other than what is expressed in the 
proposal itself. 
 Agents' preferences over proposals are assumed to be proper in the sense that 
they reflect the true benefit the agent receives from satisfying these 
preferences. For example, an agent attempting to purchase a car might assign a 
high value to a particular brand based on a false belief that this brand makes 
safer cars than other brands. In this case, the preferences do not properly 
reflect the agent's actual gain if it was to purchase that car. 
 Game-theoretic and heuristic approaches assume that agents' utilities or 
preferences are fixed. A rational agent would only modify its preferences upon 
receipt of new information, and traditional automated negotiation mechanisms 
do not facilitate the exchange of such information. 
Against this background, our model attempts to overcome the above limitations by 
allowing agents to negotiate by exchanging offers and be able to make decisions 





FUZZY LOGIC METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the methodology used to model our negotiation scenario. It 
extensively include an overview of fuzzy logic 
3.2 Overview of Fuzzy Logic 
In the words of Bertrand Russell [44]: “All traditional logic assumes that precise 
symbols are being employed. It is therefore not applicable to this terrestrial life, but 
only to an imagined celestial one. The law of excluded middle is true when precise 
symbols are employed but it is not true when symbols are vague, as, in fact, all 
symbols are”. The principle foundation of mathematics invented by the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle came up with the binary logic (0, 1). It was based on one law: A 
or not A; it is either this or not this. For example: a glass of water can be full of water 
or not full of water; a man can be old or not old and so on. Moreover, every statement 
can be true or false. Such is Aristotle’s law of bivalence and was philosophically 
correct over couple of thousands years. 
During 1960’s, a professor from the University of Berkely by the name of Lotfi 
Zader introduces fuzzy logic – a logic that disapproves Aristotle’s law of bivalence. 
He (Zader) based his logic on the concept of certain degree and multivalence. He 




3.3 Fuzzy set 
George Cantor [9] proposed the conventional set theory; which says that conventional 
set are crisp. This means a set has a rigid and well defined boundary. However, 
realistically (in a real world) things are rather fuzzy, uncertain and vague than crisp. 
Illustration 3.1: let us consider the following set of theory: “when we take a grain 
from a heap, the heap is still there, but when we keep taking grains from the heap 
until one grain is left, do we still consider it as a heap?.” Such was the dilemma posed 
by ancient Greek; which caused a real problem to logicians and mathematicians. How 
do we solve this type of paradox?  
Well, using conventional set theory, we have to set a bound. A heap can be 
formed by n grains but it is not heap if only n-1 grain is left. However, using common 
sense, we cannot really fell the boundary. The setting of bound using conventional 
theory is not clear and this makes the conventional set theory unrealistic. 
Lotfi Zader, the father of fuzzy set makes it possible for such dilemma to be 
solved. He introduces the concept of graded membership – a graded membership, 
which preceded the characteristic function of conventional set that only takes 1 or 0 
indicating whether an element is a member.  
Definition 1: a membership function of a fuzzy set A denoted UA is defined by a set of 
ordered pairs A=൛൫ݔ, ݑ஺(ݔ)൯|ݔ ∈ ܣൟ	0	 ≤ 	ݑ஺(ݔ) ≤ 1.	 
The above definition means a membership function of a fuzzy set A, UA(x)  means 
that the membership function can take any value between 0 and 1; a function that 
outclasses the conventional set theory of either 0 or 1. The larger the value of UA(x), 
the greater or higher the degree of membership. 
Let us look at another example where a person wishes to characterize the cost of 
dinner at a restaurant. Over the range of prices, a person might have three preference 
values or sets: Low, medium and high. If the cost of the dinner is low, the person is 
happy. If the cost of dinner is medium, the person is neutral. Consequently, if the 
dinner cost is high then the person will be unhappy. Classically, one might model this 
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illustration with discrete threshold points at which price transitions from low to 
medium and medium to high occur. However, this approach does not correctly model 
what happens in the real world since each individual has a different, imprecise range 
over which those preference transitions actually occur. Nevertheless, this natural 
imprecision and vagueness can be effectively handled by using fuzzy set introduced 
by Zadeh [30]. 
3.3.1 Definitions and Discussion of theory 
Unlike conventional logic, Fuzzy set theory, assumes that an element can belong to 
more than one set at a time and that its membership in a set is a matter of degree. A 
parameter’s specific or crisp value’s degree of membership in a fuzzy set is 
determined by the membership function of that set also called truth-value. A fuzzy set 
is defined by all membership function for a given variable over its range or origin of 
discourse. A common example is shown is figure 3.1. 
In rule driven fuzzy logic application, the memberships in the fuzzy sets present 
themselves in the antecedent or consequents of the rules presented in the linguistic 
expressions. In practise, triangular and trapezoidal membership functions are typically 
used because of their computational simplicity. The value of the membership function 
for any crisp parameter value indicates the degree of membership (truth-value 0 and 
1) in the related set. Adjacent membership functions overlap to a certain degree to 
reflect the fuzziness or vagueness of the set classification. The convention that all 








Figure 3.1 Membership function 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the concept of fuzzy logic. It describes the concept of 
tallness, which depend upon the height of the observer, and the concept of its use. In 
conventional logic, based on the figures above, a person would have to be classified 
either as a “not tall” person with membership equals to 0 or as “tall” person with 
membership equals to 1 as seen in the area ≥ 5’11’’ of figure 1. In the more general 
fuzzy logic, the membership function shown in figure 2 could be utilized. Below 5’7’’ 
a person is clearly no tall; above perhaps 6’3”, a person is clearly tall and at 5’11’’ a 
person might be considered half “not tall” and half “tall” with membership 0.5 in each 
fuzzy set. There is a gradual transition between these situations; perhaps between 5’7” 
and 6’3”. The vagueness will certainly vary between describing jockeys at a race track 
or players of an NBA. The ability to be tall and not tall at the same time is against the 
conventional set theory law of contradiction, which states that x cannot be in set A 
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and set not-A at the same time. 
If the evaluated person weight is added to the above discussion, one can see how 
another dimension can expand the input fuzzy sets. The question might arise if 
someone is at risk by a heart condition? This question cannot be answered by looking 
at the person weight alone since height also has to be taken into consideration when 
deciding whether a person is at risk or not. Fuzzy theory allows us to combine the 
ambiguity of both height, weight over a range of values, and help us more realistically 
classify if a person is at risk of a heart condition and at what risk factor. A fuzzy 
system is a good candidate to describe complex and not well-defined system.         
3.3.2 Fuzzy Operators 
Mathematically, the conventional logic can be written as f(x): x → {0, 1} which 
states that the membership function maps x to either 0 or 1. Fuzzy logic maps x to any 
value between 0 and 1. This can be written as f(x): x → [0, 1]. 
Fuzzy logic consists of basic operations such as union (OR) and intersection 
(AND). let us consider the following letters F, Y, Z to denote our fuzzy set used along 
this thesis and their corresponding membership functions are: UF(x), UY(x) and UZ(x) 
respectively. To represent our fuzzy operators, we consider F, Y as fuzzy set defined 
in the universe U, we then have the following list of operators. 
 Equality: if F = Y, then UF(x) = UY(x)  and x ∈ ܷ 
 Inclusion: if F ⊆ Y, then UF(x) ⊆ UY(x)  and x ∈ ܷ 
 Proper subset: if F ⊂ Y, then UF(x) ⊆ UY(x)  and x ∈ ܷ 
 Intersection: if F ∩ Y, then UF∩Y(x) = min(UF(x), UY(x)), x ∈ ܷ 
 Union: if F ⋃ Y, then UF Y(x) = max(UF(x), UY(x)), x ∈ ܷ 
By observing the fuzzy operators denoted above, we can say that the law of 
excluded middle expressed by F ∪ F = U and F ∩ F = ф is not valid in fuzzy set 
anymore. This is also represented graphically as in the following figure. 
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ܣ ∩ ̅ܣ 	≠ ∅																																																																					ܣ ∪ ܣ	ഥ 	≠ ܷ 
Figure 3.2: The law of excluded middle as it happened graphically  
 
Briefly, fuzzy sets are flexible and more suitable in describing vagueness and 
processes with incomplete and imprecise information. 
3.4 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic has emerged as an extension of classical logic – a two value logic in 
which prepositions are either true or false. The truth value of the classical logic 
denoted T2 which contains 0 for false representation and 1 being true. 
Back in 1923, Lukasiewicz introduced the law of many-value logic where the 
truth Tn has so many values beside 0 and 1 [29]. Along with Lukasiewicz, one can say 
that fuzzy set is a derivation of this many value logic. Therefore, we can see the 




Figure 3.3: Evolvement of fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is made fit to reasoning with imprecise and vague prepositions, which 
deal with natural language easily. Therefore, a methodology is made possible for 
fuzzy logic to treat linguistic variable and expressing modifiers like High, Medium, 
Low and so on. It reflects both the vagueness and rightness of natural language in 
common sense reasoning. 
3.4.1 Traditional fuzzy system 
Fuzzy system provides a nonlinear mapping between crisp numerical input variables 
and crisp numerical output variables and allows the use of linguistic expressions for 
the rules that define the input – output relationship. The rules are expressed for all 
possible combinations of the active input fuzzy sets. 
3.4.1.1 Linguistic variable 
As in [28], linguistic variables are those, which take values of words or sentences in 
natural or artificial languages. For example: height as a person height is word in 
natural language. To transform it into linguistic variable, we first have call upon 
modifiers; then a person height is expressed as {very short, short, medium tall, very 
tall}. These are called term of linguistic variable “height” and described by fuzzy set 
with corresponding membership function on a universe set U ⊂ R+.  
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The following figure describes the linguistic variable ‘height’. 
 
Figure 3.4: linguistic variable “Height” 
The fig maps the linguistic variable Height on the universe set U = [0, 100] with 
V.S = very short, S = short; M = medium; T = tall and V.T = very tall. 
3.4.1.2 Composition rule 
Composition is an operation occurring between two propositions p and q joined by 
logical connectives. Assuming A and B two fuzzy sets with A = {(x, μA(x)/x  A⊂ U1} 
and B = {(y, μB(y)/y   B⊂ U2}; and let us also assume that proposition P states that x 
is A and proposition q states that y is B. therefore the corresponding membership 
functions (μA(x),  μB(y)) represent the truth value of the propositions p and q and their 








Figure 3.5: Composition rules for fuzzy proposition 
3.4.2 Fuzzy Expert System 
A fuzzy expert system is an expert system that uses fuzzy logic instead of Boolean 
logic. In other words, a fuzzy expert system is a collection of membership functions 
and rules that are used to reason about data. Unlike conventional expert systems, 
which are mainly symbolic reasoning engines, fuzzy expert systems are oriented 
toward numerical processing. 
The rules in a fuzzy expert system are usually of a form similar to the following:  
If x is low and y is high then z is medium 
where x and y are input variables (names for known data values), z is an output 
variable (a name for a data value to be computed), low is a membership function 
called also fuzzy subset defined on x, high is a membership function defined on y, and 
medium is a membership function defined on z. The part of the rule between the "if" 
and "then" is the rule's premise or antecedent. This fuzzy logic expression describes to 
what degree the rule is applicable. The part of the rule following the "then" is the 
rule's conclusion or consequent. This part of the rule assigns a membership function to 
each of one or more output variables. Most tools for working with fuzzy expert 
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systems allow more than one conclusion per rule. A typical fuzzy expert system has 
more than one rule. The entire group of rules is collectively known as a rule-base or 
knowledge base.  
With this in hand, we now need to know how to apply this knowledge to specific 
values of the input variables to compute the values of the output variables. This 
process is referred to as inference. In a fuzzy expert system, the inference process is a 
combination of five sub processes: 
1. Fuzzification 
2. Inference Rules 
3. Evaluation of inference rule 
4. Defuzzification 
The figure below depicts the generic modelling of all these sub processes. 
 
Figure 3.6: Block diagram of fuzzy expert system 
3.4.3 Fuzzification 
In a conventional fuzzy system, fuzzification is the procedure that converts crisp 
inputs into membership in a fuzzy set or sets and calculate the truth-value for these 
fuzzy sets. To demonstrate fuzzification, a two inputs example has been developed. 
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Assuming two inputs variables, height and weight of an individual; each variable will 
have its own membership functions for their input fuzzy variables as in figure 3.8. 
The fuzzy output variable is the risk factor for having a heart attack. For this 
example, each fuzzy input variable has three fuzzy set membership possibilities and 
the output has four membership possibilities. Due to the linguistic component of 
fuzzy logic each membership function of the input variables can be classified as thin, 
average and heavy for the weight fuzzy variable and short, average and tall for the 
height fuzzy variables. The labelled fuzzy set for each input variables and output 
variables can be written as weight = {thin, average, heavy}; Height = {short, average, 
tall}; and risk factor = {low risk, average risk, moderate risk, high risk}.  
 
Figure 3.7: Schematic diagram of traditional fuzzy system 
For this particular example, imagine we want to evaluate this system with a 
weight value of 130 pound and a height of 5’3”. Figure 3.8 displays that a weight 
value of 130 pound would belong to a fuzzy set {thin} with a membership function of 
0.5 and the fuzzy set {average} with truth-value of also 0.5. Similarly, if height were 
evaluated at 5’3” it would belong to the fuzzy set {short} and {average} with truth-
value of 0.8 and 0.2 respectively. This example shows how a crisp fuzzy value inputs 
are mapped to the appropriate fuzzy set membership and associated a truth-value. 
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Figure 3.8: Two inputs example 
3.4.4 Inference Rules 
Inference rules are the next step in the fuzzy process. The fuzzy rules are the rules that 
form the logic that makes up the fuzzy system. These rules are linguistic expressions 
that link the membership in input set to membership in output set. Fuzzy rules consist 
of an antecedent (input) and a consequent (output) correlated by “If…..and …. Then” 
rule format. In logic, a rule of inference (also called a transformation rule) is a 
function from sets of formulae to formulae. The argument is called the premise set (or 
simply premises) and the value the conclusion. They can also be viewed as relations 
holding between premises and conclusions, whereby the conclusion is said to be 
inferable (or derivable or deducible) from the premises. If the premise set is empty, 
then the conclusion is said to be a theorem or axiom of the logic.  
From figure 3.8 and using the fuzzy rule bank in table 3.1 and two examples of 
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linguistic expressions, we can have the following illustration: 
 If Weight is Thin and Height is Short then The risk factor is Low. 
 If Weight is Average and Height is Short then the Risk factor is Moderate. 
If we have n terms of A and m terms of B, the total number of rule we can get is 
nm; and the rules make l different outputs. A typical rule can be written as follows: 
If Xi is Ai and……and Xm is Am, Then Y is C          (3.1) 
In expression (3.1), Xi and Y are fuzzy variables and Ai and C are fuzzy sets. There 
are an ever-growing number of fuzzy operators, but for this thesis, we only 
concentrate on the fuzzy operator AND as used in [60].  
The fuzzy rule bank forms the structure of a fuzzy system. In a typical fuzzy 
system, the number of input variables and the number of fuzzy sets determine the 
number of rules in a fuzzy rule bank that each input variable can be assigned. The 
number of fuzzy rule within fuzzy rule bank can be written as:  
∏ ௜ܰ
௠
௜ୀଵ ;        (3.2) 
In equation 3.2, m is the number of fuzzy variables and Ni is the number of fuzzy 
set defining variable i. thus the number of fuzzy rules for this example is 3 x 3 = 9. 
In a fuzzy expert system, inference rules stem from the knowledge of human 
experts, the preference of clients, or the common sense of everyday life. They can be 
redesigned at any time when there is change in the knowledge base. 
3.4.5 Fuzzy Inference 
Fuzzy logic based systems use RULES to represent the relationship between 
observations and actions. These rules consist of precondition (IF-part) and a 
consequence (THEN-part). The precondition can consist of multiple conditions linked 





Inferencing determines the fuzzy subset of each output variables for each rule. 
Usually only MIN or PRODUCT is used as inference rules. In MIN inference, the 
output membership function is clipped off at a height corresponding to the rule 
premise’s computed degree of truth (fuzzy logic AND).  
In PRODUCT inference, the output membership function is scaled by the rule 
premises computed degree of truth. Since we are using AND operator, let us look at 
the figure 3.9, in this example the truth value for Thin membership function is 0.5 and 
truth value for short membership function is 0.8. Therefore, the consequent activated 
fuzzy set, Low risk, is clipped at 0.5 at seen by the shaded area A. 
 
Figure 3.9: Inference system 
 Inference can be also represented using fuzzy matrix. A fuzzy matrix is a matrix 
associated with the linguistic expressions that map fuzzy input variable set to the 
fuzzy output variable set. Table 3.1 shows the rule matrix for the example above. The 
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column on the left side of the matrix contains the possible fuzzy input set Height, 
while the row above the matrix contains the possible fuzzy input set Weight. Within 
the fuzzy output set that correspond to the fuzzy linguistic rules are contained in the 
cells of the matrix. There are our shaded cells in the matrix below. The shading 
represents the activated fuzzy rules for this example that were created by the linguistic 
rules of the fuzzy system. 
Table 3.1 Fuzzy rule matrix 
 
The four rules represented by the four active cells are called fired rules. 
3.4.5.2 Composition 
Composition combines the fuzzy subsets for each output variable into a single fuzzy 
subset. Usually MAX or SUM are used. In MAX composition, the combined output 
fuzzy subset is constructed by taking the point wise maximum over all of the fuzzy 
subsets assigned to variable by inference rule. In SUM composition, the combined 
output fuzzy subset is constructed by taking the point wise sum over all of the fuzzy 
subset assigned to the output variable by the inference rule. 
IF-THEN rules are a common way of representing and communicating knowledge 
in everyday conversation. Anyone who has written a program or machine code knows 
how complicated (and difficult to debug, read and maintain) the if-then lines can get. 
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Fuzzy rules offer a way of getting around that by trading the precise representation of 
the values that variables must assume with much more intuitive representation. 
Generally, a rule, by itself, does not do much. What is needed are a set of rules 
that can play of one another. The fuzzy inference methodology allows “fair” 
competition between these rules to produce sophisticated answers using seemingly 
simple premises. 
3.4.6 Defuzzification 
This stage is the final function of a fuzzy system and is used to convert output set to a 
crisp number. There are several methods to be used in order to perform 
defuzzification. The most common techniques used are the Centroid and Maximum 
methods. In the Centroid method the crisp value of the output variable is computed by 
finding the value of the center of gravity of the membership function. In the 
Maximum method, the crisp value of the output variable is the maximum truth-value 
of the fuzzy subset. For a more detailed look on how different defuzzification method 
affects the output, refer again to [10]. However, we apply Centroid method for the 
purpose of this thesis.  
Centroid defuzzification as mentioned earlier on, is simply the act of finding the x 
location of the center of mass of the clipped output fuzzy sets. This function can be 
expressed as: 
Defuzzify crisp output = 
∑ ௭ೕ∗ఓ೎(௭ೕ)೜ೕసభ





FUZZY LOGIC BASED NEGOTIATION 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the framework of my research, fuzzy logic based negotiation. 
The framework, as also highlighted earlier, is about implementing a negotiation 
scenario based on fuzzy logic.  
4.2 Proposed Fuzzy Logic Based Negotiation 
As mentioned earlier on the introduction, the purpose of applying fuzzy to negotiation 
is to make it simple and comprehensive. To start, the negotiation framework is as 
depicted in the figure below: 
 
Figure 4.1: Negotiation framework 
The above framework looks simple and straightforward. It involves three main 
components: the Buyer agent (BA), the Matchmaker (MA) and the Seller agent (SA). 
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At any time, when the need of buying arises, the buyer sends the description of the 
item it needs to the BA, whereas on the other side, the seller updates the MA about 
what it has to offer. Hence, when a request from a buyer agent is received, the 
matchmaker checks to see which seller agent has the description of the item 
requested. Once a seller is located, its profile will be sent to the BA and negotiation 
between BA and SA begins. 
Our model follows an alternating-offers protocol, which means the negotiators 
propose and respond alternatively until an agreement is reached or quit the 
negotiation. The outcome of a negotiator at each step in this protocol includes: accept, 
reject and propose an offer, quit [11]. The intelligence of the negotiation agent is 
concentrated on the reasoning component model detailed in section 4.1.4; which in 
particular focuses on the processes of generating initial/counter offers, evaluating the 
incoming offers, and making decisions.  
4.2.1 Negotiation Process 
The negotiation scenario described two agents (seller and buyer) each with 
contradictory demands, seeking to reach a deal by the exchange of proposals. These 
exchanges of proposal are also called the sequence of offers and counter-offers. 
Negotiation happened over the range of pre-defined issues. Those issues are classified 
into two parts: 
 Hard constrains issues: there are issues, which cannot be negotiated. For 
example a buyer wants to buy a car, however when the seller presented him/her with 
an airplane, it is obvious there will not be any negotiation because the core object or 
item which makes room for a negotiation is not available. 
 Soft constrain issues: there are issues that make the negotiation possible and 
there represent the issues over which agents negotiate. For example, price of an item. 
The price of an item is one of the many soft constrain issues to be negotiated over for 
an agreement to be reached. 
Once the issues to be resolved are identified by both agents; then they start 
negotiating those issues by exchanging offers and counter offers.  
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4.2.2 The negotiation setup 
Let x (x ∈ {x1, x2… xm}) represents the buyer agent (BA) and y (y ∈ {y1, y2… yn}) be 
the supplier agent. In addition, let then i (i ∈ {i1, i2… in}) be the issues under 
negotiation, such as price, volume, duration, quality and so on. Each agent assigns to 
each issue i a weight	ݓ௜, denoting the relative importance of that issue to the agent. 
Hence, ݓ௜௫ represents the importance of issue i to agent x. each agent assign a value to 
each of the issues represented by: Vi ∈ [mini; maxi]. This means for each issue i there 
is a value Vi which carries a minimum and maximum value attributed to issue i. thus a 
scoring function f of an issue is presented by:    
fiα: [mini, maxi] → [0, 1]. 
Therefore, the utility function of an offer (o) is denoted as:  





Where U (O) is the overall utility for the offer O (= [O1… Om] T) and fi (vi) is the 
individual scoring function for issue i for vi∈ [0, 1] and the preference degree of an 
agent to an issue i is denoted as 	ݓ௜∈ [0, 9]. Each agent also specifies a border 
proposal, which is characterized by a minimum and maximum limit called utility level 
[Umax, Umin] to determine if an offer is acceptable. The intersection between the two 
agents’ border proposals defines what we call the deal range. If the deal range is 
empty, it means it is not reachable [8] as in fig.4.2. The utility level or border 
proposals are kept hidden from the opponent.  
 
Figure 4.2: Deal range 
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Illustration: suppose two agents are negotiating on the price of a specific product. 
Each agent has its own border proposal hidden and each one of the two know what its 
reservation price is – a reservation price is or RP represents how much the agent is 
willing to pay or get on the object in question.  
4.2.3 Negotiation Scenario 
The negotiation scenario is as follows: 
Step 1: Initialization 
1.1 A participant agent enters the e-marketplace and identifies itself as either a 
buyer or a supplier through an agent. 
1.2. Then, it submits an offer to the system (in our case, the system is 
characterized by the moderator).  
Step 2: Matching 
2.1 The system’s matching agent finds M most similar opponents to the 
participant. 
2.2 The matching agent notifies the participant and the N most similar 
opponents. 
Step 3: Negotiation 
3.1 The participant’s agent evaluates the offers from the opponents. If the 
offers are acceptable, the negotiation process goes to Step 4; otherwise, the 
process continues to Step 3.2. 
3.2 The participant’s agent used fuzzy inference systems to generate an offer. 
If the offer is not good enough for the other participant, it will counter it. This 
succession of offers and counter offers continue until a deal is made or 
deadline is reached or withdrawal of one party.   
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Step 4: The participant chooses the best offer from the complete set of negotiated              
contracts or rejects all of them. 
Figure 4.3: Agents’ interactions 
4.2.3.1 Break down of step  
As mentioned above, the first step is for initialization. In this step, each of the two 
agents has a role to play. The seller agent will advertize or update the matchmaker 
agent about any new development regarding its goods or services. The buyer agent, in 
the other hand, enquires from the matchmaker agent when there is a need of buying 
any goods or services. The matchmaker agent is confined with a database, which 
allows it to save and register all entries from suppliers’ agents and be able to retrieve 
them when there is a request after successfully matching the buyer agent request with 
the data of suppliers it has (this is done in step 2 matching). How the matchmaker 
agent stores data, manages them, retrieve them and/or matching does not constitute 
the object of this research. 
After the matchmaker agent has successfully indentifies seller agents with the 
right products/services as requested by the buyer agent. It presents to the latter with 
the list from which the buyer agent will enter into negotiation with as in step 3. The 
whole flow is again depicted in figure 4.3.  
46 
4.2.3.2 Negotiation on the mark 
This part is concerned with step 3; the negotiation. For a negotiation to start, an agent 
(BA) just needs to send an utterance to the seller agent expressing its intention to buy. 
For example:  
BA: I want to buy a laptop x, how much? 
SA: I give you for $4,500. 
Or it could be stated: 
BA: I want to offer you $1500 for your “x” laptop? 
SA: I rather want $4,500 for it. 
Either case the buyer agent now uses the offer sent by the seller and evaluates it to 
see whether it really worth spending that much for “laptop x”. Now throughout the 
thesis, we are going to use the second format of communication or inquiry. For agent 
BA to counter this offer, there are a number of things that need to be considered. First, 
BA has to look at the quality of the laptop, then warranty and all other preferences; 
for example, the color of the laptop, brand name, casing and so on. 
For instance, the quality feature of BA preferred laptop should include the 
following: 
Product      =  { (brand) ∧ (price) ∧ (warranty)} 
Computer  =  { (Notebook)¬(Laptop)} 
Model         =  {(age<1yr) ∧ processor { (Intel Pentium IV dual core); (built in 518MB VGA)} ∧	 
                               Memory {RAM (3GB); hard disk (200 GB)} ∧ software {windows (original vista);  
                        Anti virus (Kapersky); Adobe (PDF, Illustrator)}}. 
Meanwhile, let us say the SA has the following to offer: 
Product      =  { (brand) ∧ (price) ∧ (warranty)} 
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Computer =  { (Notebook)¬(Laptop)} 
Model         =  {(age<1yr) ∧ processor { (Intel Pentium IV dual core); (built in 518MB VGA)} ∧	 
                               Memory {RAM (2.5GB); hard disk (180 GB)} ∧ software {windows (original 
vista);  
                        Anti virus (Kapersky); Adobe (PDF, Illustrator)}}. 
As we can from the two product specifications, there are almost the same. The 
difference is only on the memory which realistically very slight one. The BA 
requested for a 3GB RAM and 200 GB while the SB has 2.5 GB of RAM and 180 GB 
of hard disk. Well, in such condition can BA or we conclude or take decision of no 
deal? Mathematically yes, because both specifications are not exactly the same. In 
fact, what SA has to offer could well satisfy the purpose of which Agent wants to 
purchase the laptop for; it is just that there are not identically the same (in term of 
specification). Therefore, to be able to successfully engage into negotiation, we must 
include the notion of fuzzy logic. As for the above-mentioned illustration, how BA is 
to respond? The answer is BA will counter SA using fuzzy inference rule which we 
are going to illustrate in the following sections. 
4.2.4 The Reasoning Model 
The reasoning model consists of three blocks as shown in figure 4.4:  
 Offer/counter offer generation block: the role of this block is to generate new 
offers/counter offers; 
 Offer evaluation block: the offer evaluation block holds the task of evaluating 
or analysing any incoming offer to see the degree to which this offer is acceptable and 
finally 
 Decision block: this block does the final wrapping up of the negotiation. It 
makes decision whether to accept, reject or withdraw from the negotiation. 
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Figure 4.4: The reasoning model of the negotiation 
 
Figure 4.4 describes the flow of the negotiation. It started with an incoming offer 
(notably from the seller agent), then BA evaluates it using the offer evaluation block, 
makes a decision through decision making and if there is anything about counter 
offer, then it has to be done through offer generation block.  
Hence, we can conclude that the reasoning model answers the following 
questions: 
 What counter offer should be sent out? 
 What is the range of acceptable agreement? 
 When negotiation should be abandoned? 
 And when agreement is reached? 
4.2.4.1 Offer Evaluation Block 
The offer evaluation block contains the task of evaluating incoming and counter offers 
in order to analyse the extent to which the opponent accepts the incoming or counter 
offer. It can be seen as a fuzzy expert system because of its capability of measuring 
the human preference, which is considered as vague and uncertain. Having 
conventional mathematical methodology to evaluate the degree of acceptance of the 
incoming offer is too complicated, especially when the numbers of issues grow. 
Hence, fuzzy expert makes it easy and simple to deal with such situation. 
The offer evaluation block is characterized by two inputs and an output as 
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depicted in the picture below. The inputs are: price and quality while the output 
represents the satisfaction degree denoted as G. This is to measure the level of 
satisfaction of the buyer with respect to the quality and price quoted by the seller on 
that particular item. 
The degree of satisfaction is represented by integers from 0 to 100 with 0 
represents the least satisfaction level and 100 the most satisfaction level.  
Figure 4.5: Offer evaluation model 
We use fuzzy expert system to determine the satisfaction degree as in the steps 
depicted in fig.4.6. 
Figure 4.6: Fuzzy expert system steps 
1) Fuzzification of rules: the fuzzification of rules comprises the modelling of the 
inputs and output into fuzzy sets and then set their corresponding membership 
function. The inputs and output are modelled as follows: 
 
 Input 1: Offer Price = A = {Low, medium, high} 
 Input 2: Quality = Q = {Low, medium, high} 
 Output: Satisfaction degree = G= {Low, medium, high} 
                             L = Low; M = medium; and H = high. 
50 
The next step of the fuzzification is to attribute to those defined fuzzy sets 
membership functions. 
Membership functions as also outlined in chapter III represents the generalization 
of the indicator in classical sets. In fuzzy logic, they represent the degree of truth as an 
extension of valuation. Therefore our membership functions for the above mentioned 
linguistic variables can be noted as follows: 
 u௅௢௪(ݔ) = 	 ቊ 1; 						0 ≤ ݔ ≤ ܽ௠ି௫
௠ି௔
; 			ܽ ≤ ݔ ≤ ݉     (4.2) 
 
uெ௘ௗ௜௨௠(ݔ) = 	 ൝௫ି௔௠ି௔ ; 						ܽ ≤ ݔ ≤ ݉௕ି௫
௕ି௠
; 			݉ ≤ ݔ ≤ ܾ    (4.3) 
 uு௜௚௛(ݔ) = 	 ቊ௫ି௠௛ି௠ ; 						݉ ≤ ݔ ≤ ℎ1; 									ℎ ≤ ݔ     (4.4) 
 
With these equations (4.2); (4.3) and (4.4) in hand and using a trimf membership 
function, we can easily map them into membership graph as in fig.4.6. Trimf  is a 
membership function that uses a collection of three points forming a triangle.  
 
Figure 4.7: Membership function 
Figure 4.6 shows which range is attributed to the linguistic variable Low, Medium 
and High. For instance the linguistic variable Low is any variable from 0 to a.  
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so if a = 2 then any value between 0 and 2 are considered to be Low, so on and so 
forth for the other linguistic variables Medium and High. Thus, after successfully 
determining our membership functions, we have to define our rules and this is done in 
the next section. 
 
2) Rule Inference 
Inference rules are the complete set of inference rules that map the inputs to the 
outputs. Each of the rules depends on resolving the inputs into a number of different 
fuzzy linguistic sets: Price is Low, Quality level is Moderate or price is high and so 
on. The Inputs price and quality level have to be fuzzified according to each of these 
linguistics sets before any evaluation takes place. For instance, we might want to 
know to which extent price is to be low? The membership function graph, which 
represents that extent, is on fig.4.8.   
 
Figure 4.8: Membership function graph of price 
Figure 4.7 depicts a membership function of the input variable Price = 4. As we 
can see in the figure, the rated price = 4, given our definition of low, corresponds to a 
membership of u = 0.5.  
Inference rules are based on common sense simply because as always a buyer 
would like to go for a product with high quality and low price and vice versa. The 
rules constitute the tactic of negotiation to determine G. The L, M, and H are 
linguistic terms and describe the importance level of the inputs. 
The complete sets of inference rule we can get are in table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Rule bank 
 Antecedent Consequent 
Rules Input 1 Operator Input 2 Output 
R1 
 
 If Price is Low 
 
And 
Quality is Low  Then Buyer 
satisfaction Degree is  
Moderate 
R2 If Price is L And  Quality is M Then BSD is H 
R3 If Price is L  And  Quality is H Then BSD is H 
R4 
 
If Price is M 
 
And  
Quality is L Then BSD is L 
R5 
 
If Price is M 
 
And  
Quality is M Then BSD is M 
R6 
 
If Price is M 
 
And  
Quality is H Then BSD is H 
R7 
 
If Price is H 
 
And  
Quality is L Then BSD is L 
R8 
 
If Price is H 
 
And  
Quality is M Then BSD is L 
R9 
 
If Price is H 
 
And 
Quality is H Then BSD is M 
L = Low; M = Moderate; H = High and BSD = Buyer satisfaction degree. 
 
Examining these rules defined in table 4.1, we note that they are composed of: 
a) Antecedent: antecedents are the inputs around which rules are formed or 
defined. 
b) Consequent: consequent represents the output or the consequence resulting 
from the combination of the inputs. 
c) Operator: Operators are connectors. Their role is to join the inputs together in 
order to give a meaningful output. There exist two essential operators: AND which 
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account for the minimum value of two inputs and OR which takes the maximum value 
for any two or more inputs. 
Illustration: let us consider price = {0 1 2 3 4} and Quality = {2 1 3 4 5}.  
Assuming the combination between price and quality using AND, OR operators give 
us C, we will have the following result shown in table 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. 
 
Table 4.2: Combination of Price, Quality using AND operator 
 
Table 4.3: Combination of Price, Quality using OR operator 
 
 
Table 4.2 depicts a combination of price, quality using AND operator. As we can 
see, when using AND, the combination price and quality results in taking the least or 
minimum value among them. However, applying OR operator results in taking the 
maximum value of the two inputs as in Table 4.3. 
3) Composition 
Composition or aggregation is the process or step in which all the rules must be 
combined in some manner in order to give a decision. The task of the composition is 
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to combine all the fuzzy sets that represent the output into a single fuzzy set. Figure 




Figure 4.9: Composition of rule 
As depicted in figure 4.9, all the output of the rules (constituting the BSD) will be 
combined together and difuzzify. 
4) Defuzzification 
Defuzzification is now the process of transforming those rules specified in the 
inference rules into something quantifiable. Defuzzification also requires conversion 
of the fuzzy output into a crisp single number.  When applying defuzzification, there 
are methods we need to apply. The most common defuzzification method is the 
Centroid method which we use in this thesis. A Centroid method of defuzzification 
just returns the center of an area under curve.  This means to difuzzify, we need to 
group all the BSD shape resulting from the rules in a single shape and calculate the 








Figure 4.10: Defuzzification  
 
The last graph in the right side of figure 4.10 represents the result of 
defuzzification from each rule. Now, we need to combine both figures in order for us 
to get a shape and later using Centroid method to determine our crisp output. Figure 
4.11 shows the defuzzified shape. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Defuzzified crisp output 
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Illustration 4.1 (finding satisfaction degree): for illustration purpose, let us go 
back to our previous example about a buyer agent BA who desires to purchase a 
laptop from a seller agent SA. 
BA: I want to offer you $1500 for your “x” laptop? 
SA: I rather want $4,500 for it. 
Now, BA has to evaluate this offer and see whether it is a good bargain. This done 
by using fuzzy expert system as mentioned above. To determine the buyer satisfaction 
degree by means of fuzzy expert system manually is complex; therefore, we use 
MATLAB to simulate the output. 
At the beginning of the process of using MATLAB, we have to set the utility 
value of our variables. The variables in question are Price and Quality. 
 
 Price: ൜ ݑ௠௜௡ = 800ݑ௠௔௫ = 4700 
 Quality: ൜ ݑ௠௜௡ = 0ݑ௠௔௫ = 10 
 Satisfaction degree: ൜ ܵܦ௠௜௡ = 0ܵܦ௠௔௫ = 100 
The above notation simply means for example price is chosen from 800 to 4700. 
This is to say that price offered or received below 800 is considered out of the deal. 
On the other hand, price that exceeds 4700 will neither constitute the object of 
negotiation.  
Quality range has also to be between 0 being the least and 10 highest. The same 
thing also goes to the satisfaction degree. This is computed as in figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12: Screen shot from Matlab utility specification window 
Figure 4.12 shows where to key in the utility function for the input price as well as 
the membership function we use. The same goes to Quality and satisfaction degree. 
Later comes the specification of rules in figure 4.13 below: 
 
Figure 4.13: Rule editor 
Lastly, the system runs it, gives us the result in terms of surface, and rules in 
figure 4.14 and 4.15 respectively. The rule evaluation figure is to make our job easier 
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because it contains a rectangular box down in the left where you can specify your 
input value and simultaneously it will give you the corresponded crisp output. With 
this, one does not need to repeat the process every time there is a change in the value 
of price or quality. 
 
Figure 4.14: Screenshot of surface viewer 
 
Figure 4.15: Matlab rule evaluation screen shot 
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The rule evaluation screen shot is a comprehensive figure where you can see how 
many inputs and output are taken into consideration, how many rules are defined and 
what are the ranges or utilities over which these inputs and output are set. 
Nonetheless, at the top of the figure, we can clearly see, at medium Quality of the 
laptop (quality = 5) and with the price the seller quotes which is = 4500, the buyer 
satisfaction degree is 27.5%. This value (27.5%) represents the defuzzified crisp value 
of the illustration. The crisp value found there above represents rule 2 which states 
that: 
Rule 2: If Price is High, Quality is Medium, Satisfaction Degree is Low 
The satisfaction degree found above justifies rule 2 and it can be computed using 
the center of gravity (COG) defuzzification method formula. 
ܥܱܩ = ∑ ௭ೕ∗ఓ೎(௭ೕ)೜ೕసభ
∑ ఓ೎∗(௭ೕ)೜ೕసభ ;    (4.5) 
Where q = number of quantization levels of the output 
ݖ௝ =	the amount output at quantization level j 
ߤ௖൫ݖ௝൯ =	membership value in C. 
To compute rule 4 manually, we need to again use the help of figure 4.15 and 
reproduce the concerned graph in 4.16 below 
 
Figure 4.16: Defuzzified shape of R4 
The Matlab evaluation system does not run the rules individually. This means if 
you have inputs and want to find out the output, the Matlab system runs through every 
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single rule that has been computed before determining the output. This is because 
what we are using is a fuzzy system and when dealing with fuzzy logic we are often 
faced with membership function. For instance when we define our input price = 4500, 
we know for sure it is high, but we don’t know how high it is? So in order to 
understand how high is 4500, we need to refer to its membership. And as outline in 
fig 4.15, Price = 4500 is considered to be high at approximately 0.9 of membership 
and consequently 0.1 medium. 
Going back to figure 4.16, we now understand that in order to transform R4 into 
something quantifiable, we need also to involve R8 to certain degree. Let us then 
evaluate those two rules: 
Rule 2: If Price is High AND Quality Medium, then Satisfaction degree is Low  
 
Therefore ݖ௝ =	 min (ߤ௖(ܲ),ߤ௖(ܳ))  
                 ݖ௝ = ܕܑܖ	(0.9; 1) 
                      ࢠ࢐ = ૙.ૢ 
Rule 8: If Price is Medium AND Quality is Medium then Satisfaction Degree is 
Medium. 
 
Therefore ݖ௝ =	min (ߤ௖(ܲ),ߤ௖(ܳ)) 
                ݖ௝ = ܕܑܖ	(0.1; 1) 
                      ࢠ࢐ = ૙.૚ 







 Now that the buyer agent has evaluated the incoming offer from the seller agent, 
the reasoning model suggests that the seller agent will look into decision block to see 
if the current offer made by the seller agent is acceptable. What action should be 
taken, given the seller agent offer? Would it be an acceptance, rejection or 
countering? We will surely find the answer in the decision making block in the next 
section. 
4.1.4.2. Decision Making Block 
The function of the decision block model is to make decision after the evaluation 
block has finished its task. The decision function gives the final verdict whether to 
accept any incoming offer rejects it or counter it with an offer. It can be simplified 
according to simple and comprehensive rules as follows: 
 
 Reject the Offer: ൜
݂݅	ܵܦ௡			ܵܦ௠௜௡
݂݅	ܱ௜௡௖௢௠௜௡௚ > ܷ௠௔௫௢ ; (4.6) 
 
 Accept/counter the Offer: ൜݂݅	ܱ௜௡௖௢௠௜௡௚ 	≤ 	ܷ௠௜௡
௢
݈݁ݏ݁, ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ݁ݎ   (4.7) 
With ܵܦ௡	= satisfaction degree at time n; ܵܦ௠௜௡ = minimum satisfaction degree 
set by the buyer; ܱ௜௡௖௢௠௜௡௚ = Incoming Offer from the seller; ܷ௠௔௫௢  = Maximum 
utility offer of the buyer; ܷ௠௜௡௢  = Minimum Utility Offer of the buyer. 
Equation (4.6) suggests that if the buyer satisfaction degree is less than the 
minimum satisfaction degree or if the incoming offer is greater than the maximum 
utility of the offer, then the buyer agent rejects the offer proposed by the seller. 
However, equation (4.7) states that if the incoming offer is less or equal to the 
minimum utility offer of the buyer, buyer agent will have to accept the proposal of the 
seller; else, buyer agent goes into countering the seller proposal.  However, this 
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decision making block is too easy to avoid an impasse in a negotiation process. 
Hence, we assume two external constrains limit the negotiation process: the round of 
negotiation and duration, which are predefined by the user at the start of the 
negotiation to avoid an endless negotiation process. 
  Referring to the above-determined evaluation and considering the decision 
function in equation (4.6) and (4.7) we now can have a clear picture on what the BA 
decision is going to be? With 27.5% satisfaction degree, the BA will automatically 
counter the offer for a good bargain. Well, countering an offer is a subject of Offer 
generation Block. 
4.1.4.3.Offer Generation Block 
The offer generation block determines what counter offer should be sent out. Offer 
generation engine/block can be seen as Distributed Fuzzy Constraint Satisfaction 
Problem. The modelling of this block has been done using functions called tactics. 
The way those tactics were tuned in using weight are called strategies. Tactics are the 
set of functions that determine how to compute the value of an issue using a single 
criterion such as time, behaviour, resource and so on…a lot of research has been done 
in this area using those criterion as in [1, 44, and 54].  
However, our model uses a quite different methodology. In line with our objective 
of designing a fuzzy logic based negotiation agent, we decided to incorporate the 
notion of fuzzy logic throughout the process of negotiation. Therefore, our offer 
generation engine has been designed using fuzzy set theory.  So in order to determine 
the counter offer, we need to define our concession rate ‘r’. Hence, we call upon two 
linguistic variables, which will help us determine our Counter offer as depicted in 
figure 4.17 below. 
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Figure 4.17: Inference method using max product 
Figure 4.16 details the process from which the ratio for the next round “r” is going 
to be determined. To do so, we need to call upon two linguistic variables to constitute 
our inputs. 
The first linguistic variable is the buyer satisfaction degree (BSD) mentioned in 
fig 4.17. The second linguistic variable, which we are going to determine, is the ratio 




With ݔ௡	= initial price proposed by the seller at time n;  	ݕ௡ିଵ = price the buyer 
proposes at time ݊ − 1. 
We, then, need to transform the crisp values of those linguistic variables SD and 
Df into grade of membership for linguistic terms of fuzzy sets. This fuzzy sets is 
characterized each by 5 linguistic terms {VL, L, M, H, VH} denoting Very Low; 
Low; Medium; High; and Very High respectively. For each linguistic term, there is a 
membership function associated with it and so the membership functions of the two 




Figure 4.18:  Membership function of SD 
Figure 4.17 maps the satisfaction degree of the buyer equals to 27.5% as found in 
illustration 4.1. therefore at SD = 27.5%, we found that the 5 linguistic terms {VL; L; 
M; H; VH} are {0; 0.6; 0.4; 0; 0}.  
If we may again recall illustration 4.1 here above; the offer price the buyer agent 
has proposed initially was RM 1500, while the seller counter that offer by proposing 
an amount of RM 4500. Considering these two offer prices and apply equation 4.8, 




Therefore, at  Df  = 0.66, we have the following graph membership function. 
 
Figure 4.19: Membership function of Df 
At Df = 0.66, our five linguistic terms are {0; 0; 0.8; 0.2; 0}. 
Now we have defined our two variables, so to get something out of them we have 
to use inference method with max product. The output of this method is the grades of 
membership for the 5 linguistic terms of linguistic variable C. to determine the value 
of the linguistic variable C, there are two steps involved: 
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 The first step is to generate the product of grades membership out of SD and 
Df. So given the grades of membership of the two variable {0; 0.6; 0.4; 0; 0} for SD 
and {0; 0; 0.8; 0.2; 0} for Df, the product of these two grades SD x Df which represent 
C is a set of matrix Ґ shown in figure below. 














The matrix Ґ in table 4.2 is characterized as follows. The first row represents the 
linguistic variables for the satisfaction degree SD and the first column represents the 
linguistic variable for the ratio of difference Df . 
 The second step consists of selecting the maximum value as the grade of 
membership for each linguistic term. Therefore, the grades of membership for C are 
{0; 0.48; 0.32; 0; 0}. 
Now that we have determined C with its corresponding linguistic variable or 
grade of membership, we difuzzify it in order to get our ‘r’ that represents the ratio 
that determines the next counter offer from the buyer agent. The defuzzification 
method adopted is again the Centroid method. The output of this method is a crisp 
value of a linguistic variable, the x-axis position of the gravity center of some areas, 
which are derived from the grades of membership of the linguistic variable. For this 
case, the output is a crisp value of linguistic variable C, the concession rate, denoted 
by	ݎ௡ାଵ. The rate is used to compute the counter offer in (i+1) th-round proposal. 
So given the grades of membership {0; 0.48; 0.32; 0; 0} for linguistic variable C, 
apply the Center of Gravity method to difuzzify and obtain a crisp value 0.14. This 
value represents the value of	ݎ௡ାଵ as deduced in figure 4.19   
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Figure 4.20: Membership function of linguistic variable C 
This crisp value of 0.28 is finally used as a ratio to compute the counter offer 
using equation 4.9. 
ݔ௡ାଵ = 	 ݔ௡(1 + 	ݎ௡ାଵ);   (4.9) 
With	ݔ௡ାଵ = ݊݁ݔݐ	݌ݎ݋݌݋ݏ݈ܽ; ݔ௡ = previous proposal and 	ݎ௡ାଵ = concession rate 
for this round. 
 Illustration 4.2:  referring back to our illustration 4.1 we will have the 
following scenario. 
 
o BA: I want to offer you $1500 for your “x” laptop. 
o SA: I rather want $4,500 for it. 
o  (From here the buyer agent needs to use fuzzy logic in order to counter/give 
another offer suitable. Process of evaluation has been carried out in section 4.1.4.1, 
followed by decision taking in 4.1.4.2).  
o The decision taken in 4.1.4.2 is to counter. The task of counter the offer has 
been explained in section 4.1.4.3 and we came out with a ratio of 0.28 for the next 
offer, the buyer agent needs to use. Hence, applying equation 4.9; the next offer the 
buyer agent is to send to the seller is: 
 





SIMULATION AND RESULT 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses result and analysis of our simulation based on the model 
discussed in chapter four. The simulation is based on a buyer agent and a seller agent 
with the willingness of striking a deal with one another. At the outset of the 
negotiation, both buyer and seller determine or set their objectives. For example; for 
this thesis, we place ourselves in the buyer side, a buyer has to key in all necessary 
information in term of task to be performed to the computer for the buyer agent to 
carry on.  
5.2 Simulation  
The simulation is based on two scenarios. The first scenario evaluation is based on 
three inputs namely: Price, Quality and Warranty and an output that is the satisfaction 
degree. That means the buyer agent here is bound to make a decision based on these 
three attributes/inputs. However, the first thing to do when presented with such a 
scenario is to determine the satisfaction degree of the buyer agent (or seller agent) 
upon reception of an input from the seller agent.  This is primordial for the buyer 
agent to first know the extent of its satisfaction towards the negotiation. The 
satisfaction degree as explained in chapter 4 in section 4.1.4.1 has to go through 
fuzzification of its inputs until the step of defuzzification in order to present/compute 
out a crisp output constituting the extent to which the agent is satisfied. To begin with 
scenario one, it is imminent to define the setting from which the scenario is based 
upon or derived from. 
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Scenario I 
The inputs and output utility functions are defined as follows: 
 Price: ൜ ݑ௠௜௡ = 800ݑ௠௔௫ = 4700 
 Quality: ൜ ݑ௠௜௡ = 0ݑ௠௔௫ = 10 
 Warranty: ൜ܹݐݕ௠௜௡ = 1ܹݐݕ௠௔௫ = 3 
 Satisfaction degree: ൜ ܵܦ௠௜௡ = 0ܵܦ௠௔௫ = 100; 
These utilities are the same as the one used in illustration 4.1 with the exception of 
warranty, which constitute a new addition. The warranty is scaled over 1 year to 3 
years with 1 being the least and 3 the highest. It is important to define the utility 
functions of each attribute or issue as this makes the system know from where we are 
going. Should the price utilities for example be forgotten or unidentified, the system 
will not be able to accurately understand or calculate how much the agent is willing to 
propose. In addition, it will be difficult for the system to tell at what price, the item 
that is being negotiated is considered to be high.  It could be noted that the utilities are 
to help the system make boundaries or limit its domain. Moreover, the settings of 
these utilities are not meant to fix the price to a specific amount but rather serve as a 
range for the flow of negotiation. The evaluation of all rules in table 5.1 is depicted in 
the figure below (fig 5.1) using Matlab. Table 5.1 below details the rules deduced 




Figure 5.1: Rules surface 
 
Table 5.1: Rule Bank 
1
. 
IF P is L Q is L Wty is L SD is L 
2
. 
IF P is L Q is L Wty is M SD is L 
3
. 
IF P is L  Q is L Wty is H SD is M 
4
. 
IF P is L Q is M Wty is L SD is M 
5
. 
IF P is L Q is M Wty is M SD is H 
6
. 
IF P is L  Q is M Wty is H SD is H 
7
. 
IF P is L Q is H Wty is L SD is H 
8
. 
IF P is L Q is H Wty is M SD is H 
9
. 
IF P is L Q is H Wty is H SD is VH 
1
0. 
IF P is M Q is L Wty is L SD is VL 





IF P is M Q is L Wty is H SD is L 
1
3. 
IF P is M Q is M Wty is L SD is M 
1
4. 
IF P is M Q is M Wty is M SD is M 
1
5. 
IF P is M Q is M Wty is H SD is M 
1
6. 
IF P is M Q is H Wty is L SD is M 
1
7. 
IF P is M Q is H Wty is M SD is H 
1
8 
IF P is M Q is H Wty is H SD is H 
1
9. 
IF P is H Q is L Wty is L SD is VL 
2
0. 
IF P is H Q is L Wty is M SD is VL 
2
1. 
IF P is H Q is L Wty is H SD is L 
2
2. 
IF P is H Q is M Wty is L SD is L 
2
3. 




IF P is H Q is M Wty is H SD is M 
2
5. 
IF P is H Q is H Wty is L SD is M 
2
6. 
IF P is H Q is H Wty is M SD is H 
2
7. 
IF P is H Q is H Wty is H SD is H 
 
P = Price;  Q= Quality;  Wty = Warranty;  SD= Satisfaction degree 
VL = Very Low;  L = Low;  M = Medium;  H = High;  VH = Very High 
Now that we have the rules in order, we now must determine the satisfaction 
degree resulting from it.  





$4700 0 1 8% 
4500 0 1 8.11% 
4300 0 1 8.34% 
4100 0 1 8.66% 
3900 0 1 8.71% 
3700 0 1 8.78% 
3500 0 1 8.86% 
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3300 0 1 8.92% 
3100 0 1 8.97% 
2900 0 1 9.07% 
2700 0 1 9.18% 
2500 0 1 13.7% 
2300 0 1 16.8% 
2100 0 1 19.1% 
1900 0 1 20.9% 
1700 0 1 22.2% 
1500 0 1 23.3% 
Table above shows the different satisfaction degree to be obtained when price 
varies; whereas quality and warranty remained fixed. It details the percentage or the 
satisfaction degree resulting from each combination of price, quality and warranty. If 
one may recall the objective of this thesis is to incorporate the notion of fuzzy logic 
throughout the process of negotiation. However, one of the elements of fuzzy logic is 
the mapping of input through output using fuzzy rule as shown in table 5.1. This has 
allowed us to determine the different percentage or changes in the satisfaction degree 
in table 5.2. Since the satisfaction degree constitutes a key element in the notion of 
fuzzy logic, this makes it easier for us to determine the counter offer provided that we 
also find the ratio of difference between the last two successive offers using equation 
4.8 in section 4.1.4.3. The analysis of Table 5.2 and figure 5.2 suggests that for any 
price change the satisfaction degree also varies. This is to say that satisfaction degree 
is function of all the tree attributes/issues. Any change in them could result in a 
change in the satisfaction degree. nevertheless, figure 5.2 demonstrates how practical 
the satisfaction degree is; for it doesn’t only determine the satisfaction degree but it 
also make sense to the sense that it, to some extent simulate the possible behavior 
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humans create vis-à-vis negotiation. For instance, when the price is $4700, quality is 
zero and warranty = 1, then the buyer satisfaction degree is 8%. But when the price 
shifts to $3500 for example, the satisfaction degree rises to 8.86% even though quality 
and warranty remain unchanged.  This fact again highlights the importance of 
specifying fuzzy rule as shown in table 5.1. 
To further highlight the importance and stability of the system with regard to 
determining the satisfaction degree, we made another simulation but this time, by 
keeping the price fix and have the quality varies. The table and figure 5.2 explain 
another relationship. Keeping price level fix at $ 800, the above-mentioned table and 
figure detail the sensitivity of the satisfaction degree when the quality level of the 
item varies.  If we look at table 5.2 first row, we realize when the price is $4700, 
quality = 0 and warranty is 1, the satisfaction degree of the buyer is 8%. However, 
table 5.3 returns a 25% satisfaction degree to the buyer when the price is reduced to a 
lower value of $800.  
Now as stated earlier on that we need at first to compute the satisfaction degree to 
understand how satisfied the buyer/seller is given a particular offer/proposal; we then 
need to determine the next offer concession, as satisfaction degree alone is not enough 
to make a decision as we have demonstrated in chapter 4. Consequently, we also need 
to define our ratio of difference denoted as Df as in section 4.1.4.3. This is because for 
every proposal, there will be a new price offer and as such, the ratio of difference 
plays an important role in determining the next counter offer. 
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Figure 5.2: Price variation vs. Satisfaction degree 
 
Table 5.3: Quality changes vs. Satisfaction degree 
Price Quality Warranty Satisfaction 
Degree 
800 0 1 25% 
800 1 1 31% 
800 1.2 1 32% 
800 1.4 1 32.9% 
800 1.6 1 33.8% 
800 1.8 1 34.7% 
800 2 1 35.5% 
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800 2.2 1 36.3% 
800 2.4 1 37.1% 
800 2.6 1 37.9% 
800 2.8 1 38.7% 
800 3 1 39.5% 
800 3.2 1 40.3% 
800 3.4 1 41.2% 
800 3.6 1 42.1% 
800 3.8 1 43% 
800 4 1 44% 
800 4.2 1 45% 
800 5 1 50% 
800 7 1 60.5% 
800 9 1 69% 
800 10 1 75% 
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Figure 5.3: Satisfaction degree vs. quality 
Table 5.4 as well as figure 5.4 details the different satisfaction and their respective 
concession rate. For every different satisfaction degree, there is also one different 
concession rate. Now the concession rate (as explained in section 4.1.4.3) determines 
how much the buyer/seller needs to advance, in the form of a ratio, as an addition to 
his current proposal for the deal to happen. That means if the buyer agent receives a 
counter offer from the seller agent and it (BA) satisfaction degree rose to 9.07%, then 
it is very luckily that the BA next counter offer will be in excess of 19.75% from the 
previous offer. Subsequently, if another counter offer has been sent to the BA and this 
time the satisfaction degree of BA is 20.9%, then the BA is likely to improve its 
previous offer by 38.9%.  Moreover, the offer and counter offers continue until one 
agent is satisfied and/or the negotiation is terminated. 




































Figure 5.4: Satisfaction degree vs. concession rate 
 
Proposals of Scenario I:  
o BA: First offer for “x” laptop → $1500  
o SA: First Offer for “x” laptop → $4,500  
o BA: First Counter Offer →$ 1920 
o SA: First Counter Offer → $3825 
o BA: Second counter Offer→ $2617 
o SA: Second Counter Offer → $3199 
o BA: Third Counter Offer → $3275 
 
The above Scenario proposal depicts sequences of offers between the buyer agent 
and the seller agent. The respective amounts displayed for both agents are determined 
through the modelling process discussed in chapter four. In this scenario, we can see 
that each buyer and seller is receiving an offer from its counterpart, determine 
whether the incoming offer is acceptable, and then make decision of a counter. for 












example, at offer $1920 sent by the buyer to seller agent, the latter has to determine its 
satisfaction degree which is computed and shown in appendix A under “satisfaction 
degree as in the rules viewer”. The seller then determines the ratio of difference using 
equation 4.8. Moreover, the fuzzy linguistic variables title in appendix A explains and 
shows the different combinations and variable values concerned before reaching to 
the final offer. In fact, when we look at appendix A under fuzzy linguistic variables, 
the incoming offer of $1920 received from BA has satisfied the seller agent at 39.9%. 
At this stage of the negotiation, the ratio of the difference is 0.57(equation 4.8) which 
resulted in a counter offer ratio of 0.85 after determining both linguistic variables for 
SD, DF and concession rate.    
In this scenario, the acceptable price that enables the buyer agent to finalize the 
negotiation is $3199. In fact, the buyer agent has already determined an offer to send 
to the seller agent and that offer is quite good for the seller agent than its own counter 
offer of $3199. However, the buyer agent third counter offer is obviously greater than 
the earlier incoming offer from the seller agent. Therefore, the buyer agent accepts the 
seller second counter offer to maximize its utility. This also highlights one of the 
qualities of the agent to realize an optimum outcome and an added advantage for the 
agent not to make excessive offer. Another interesting remark is that, whenever 
negotiation is on and the seller agent keeps decreasing its initial offer, the buyer agent 
satisfaction degree rises. As we can see in the scenario, the buyer satisfaction degree 
increases from the initial degree of 27.5% (found in illustration 4.1) to 35.4% and 





Figure 5.5: Successive offers between buyer and seller 
Appendix A. shows more on how these counter offers value were coming from. 
Besides fig.5.4 displays the successive movements of offers between buyer and seller 
and the agreed price of $3199, as we can see in the figure, is right above the 
intersection range. 
Scenario II: 
The scenario II is based on scenario I with the exception of attributes or issues, which 
are in excess from the previous one. This means that scenario II is simulated using 
four attributes/issues namely: Price, Quality, Warranty, and Delivery time. The 
utilities’ settings are the same as scenario I except for delivery time, which is in the 
range of [1-3]. 
 Determining the satisfaction degree 
Figure 5.6 shows the different satisfaction degree of scenario II (satisfaction degree 
SC II) and how variant these values are from the satisfaction degree of scenario I 
(satisfaction degree SC I). The figure 5.6 is drawn out from the satisfaction degree of 
scenario II in table 1B; which is in appendix B. This is done in an effort to understand 
how efficient the negotiation will be when several issues are taken into consideration. 
In this scenario, we are trying to see, among others, the difference this one inclusion 
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of issue delivery time has in the resulting output compared to scenario I. at first, we 
notice that there exists a difference in the satisfaction degree for scenario I and II as 
outlined in tables 1B and 2B in appendix B. 
After process of determining satisfaction degree, decision-making until 
concession rate have been duly gone through, here are the possible interaction and 
offer exchange that result from the simulation. For complete and comprehensive 
details on how these figures or interaction value below were obtained, please refer to 
appendix B under fuzzy linguistic variables.    
 
Offer Exchanges between BA and SA 
o BA: First offer for “x” laptop → $1500  
o SA: First Offer for “x” laptop → $4,500  
o BA: First Counter Offer →$ 1975 
o SA: First Counter Offer → $3208.5 
o BA: Second counter Offer→ $2786 
o SA: Second Counter Offer → $2444.49s 
The above offer exchange shows the interactions BA and SA went through to 
reach an agreed price of $2786 for the item ‘x” laptop. From the initial price of $1500, 
BA offered to the SA, the BA has managed to increase his offer until a price of 
$2786. Meanwhile, the SA has decreased his pricing of $4500 to the same final offer 
of $2786. Both seller and buyer agent has gone through the same process of 
determining the satisfaction degree once an offer has been received, deciding whether 
to quit, accept or counter and finally make an offer if there is. On the other hand, in 
scenario, both agents SA and BA came to an agreement in the price of $2786 
compared to $3199 in scenario I. This difference is characterized by the addition of 
delivery time coming into the scenario. Although the delivery time range is from 1 to 
3 but it made a significant difference from the satisfaction degree to the final price 
(from $3199 to $2786).  Table 1B and 2B in appendix B show the difference between 
the satisfaction degrees of scenario I and II when price changes and Quality changes 
simultaneously. Finally, as we look at figure 5.7, one can also realize that for this 
scenario or this particular buyer and seller agents, it only took at least 3 proposals to 
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realize an agreement. Meanwhile, it has taken the BA and SA 4 round of proposals to 
reach an agreement in scenario I.   
 
Figure 5.6: Satisfaction degree SCI vs. SCII 
 
 
Figure 5.7: BA and SA proposals exchange 
  

















CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter is divided into two sections; the first is the conclusion of our works. 
The second section presents recommendations for future works. 
6.2 Conclusion  
The model presented in this thesis work is a form of negotiation using fuzzy logic 
approach. The main contribution entails with the application of fuzzy logic to agent-
mediated negotiations. Our proposal first intends to make negotiation scenario more 
human, and second, it also intends to make the negotiation approach more profitable 
for buyers and seller. This work provides a contribution to the area of electronic 
negotiation since it gives the user a simple yet powerful tool that allows him/her to 
quickly discard proposals that are not well sound. 
The model presented in this thesis work is based upon fuzzy logic, which allows it 
to be able to solve complex problems plagued with uncertainty and vagueness. Albeit 
these researches [1, 44, 54, and 55], which also use fuzzy logic to model their work, at 
some points their use of fuzzy logic, are not to a large extend.  They prefer to 
incorporate the notion of fuzziness to a certain aspect. This paper makes it possible to 
design and model a negotiation using fuzzy logic through out the whole phase of 
negotiation. This means this thesis work applies fuzzy logic from evaluating 
offers/proposals; making decision about them and finally generating a counter offer if 
needed.  As we witness, today the business industry is developing at extremely fast 
rates; new industries and forms of businesses are emerging; thus making the business 
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environment so complex. These complexities can be translated into issues to be 
resolved during the course of negotiation. As such the vaguer these issues can be the 
more complex the negotiation modelling would become. For instance, modelling an 
issue like “Delivery time” or “Privacy” can be very much complicated if we were to 
use mathematical or heuristic methodology. In fact, these issues are relatively 
intangible; therefore, it is difficult to attribute exact values to any of them.  
The model designed in this thesis allows the user first to measure the degree of 
attractiveness the seller proposal could present. This allows the system to be prepared 
for the decision to be followed. Should the decision is to go for a counter offer, the 
system will again use the same ration or degree of attractiveness value to determine 
the right counter offer. By doing so, the system will be able to make its concession or 
the ratio for its next counter offer accordingly and not heuristically. For instance [54] 
uses also fuzzy logic to model its negotiation. Its model is divided into two parts, 
which are connected in parallel. The first part uses fuzzy logic to measure the buyer 
acceptance degree and the second part uses time dependant tactic to generate counter 
offers. However, one might wonder what is the use of determining the satisfaction 
degree? Perhaps to allow the system to make a decision on whether to accept, reject or 
counter the offer. Nevertheless, when it comes to counter offer, the system excludes 
the acceptance degree to be part of the determination of counter offer and yet uses a 
different approach of negotiation modelling (time dependant approach). This model 
uses rather a simple and powerful approach in fuzzy logic. This simplicity makes this 
work attractive in e-negotiation department and allows a fast and efficient way of 
human wise negotiation approach.  
The main contribution of this research can be highlighted out in two main points. 
Firstly, the application of fuzzy sets to evaluate negotiators’ preference/degree of 
satisfaction in different proposal has enhanced the bargaining efficiency. In our 
model, neither time nor resource constitutes the deciding factor for agents’ decision 
making or making a counter offer. Agents, here, make decisions based on the outcome 
of the satisfaction degree; which is characterized by the issues or element involved in 
the negotiation (issues ranging from price, quality, warranty and so on). Secondly, the 
use of fuzzy logic to determine the concession rate, which constitutes the key factor 
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for the proposition of a new offer. Fuzzy logic has been widely acknowledged for its 
ability to design vagueness and model qualitative data into something of crisp value. 
In addition, this algorithm once refined to each area under the industry of software 
development can be used for subsequent projects, saving large percentages of time, 
money, and effort, without sacrificing quality. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Work 
This thesis opens up a realm of possibilities where future researchers can produce a 
more powerful, user friendly software that can analyze and design issues in 
negotiation that are qualitative and vague. Our experimental result particularly the 2 
scenarios suggest that the fuzzy-based model often takes fewer numbers of rounds to 
finish the negotiation. Exchanging fuzzy values as offers leads to a more flexible 
negotiation. Intuitively, when agents play more flexibly, the risk of coming to a 
failure should be less. In this work, we have used the simplest format to keep our 
model easy and to focus more on the concept of negotiating with qualitative values. 
Many open questions are left for future work. For instance, the impact of having too 
many issues could be an object of another research. Our research choices up to 4 
issues in the experiments which is in line with the fact that in business there are no 
many issues to deal with. If one feels with the need of buying an item, the relevant 
issues that affect the transaction is quality, warranty, price, delivery time and perhaps 
couple of policies if any. Moreover, our fuzzy defuzzification method used in this 
thesis is “Memdani” for its simplicity and popularity whenever the use of fuzzy logic 
is used. Therefore it is also imminent to know how well is modeling this type of 
negotiation with sugeuno.  Finally, negotiation over predefined linguistic values could 
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Seller agent settings: 
Price range [800 4700] 
Quality       [0 10] 
Satisfaction degree [0 100] 
Matlab settings and results 
The matlab setting and result represents the evaluation of seller agent only.  For 
the buyer agent, please refer to illustration 4.1. 
Rules bank
 




Satisfaction degree as in the rules viewer 
 when the seller agent satisfaction degree is 39.9% 
 




Fuzzy Linguistic variables 
 Incoming Offer received from BA ($1920). At this price: 
 Satisfaction degree of Seller agent; SD = 39.9% 
 Df = 0.57 
 Linguistic variable for SD = {0; 0.399; 0.601; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variable for Df = {0; 0; 0.722; 0.278; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0.288; 0.434; 0; 0} 
 Seller agent first counter offer ratio is 0.8. 
 
 Incoming Offer received from SA ($3825); so at this price BA: 
 Satisfaction Degree is : SD = 35.4% 
 Df = 0.49 
 Linguistic variables for SD = {0; 0.548; 0.452; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variables for Df = {0; 0; 1; 0; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0.548; .452; 0; 0} 
 Buyer agent second counter offer rate is 0.363. 
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 Incoming Offer received from BA ($2617); at this price SA: 
 Satisfaction Degree is: SD = 50% 
 Df = 0.315 
 Linguistic variables for SD ={0; 0; 1; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variables for Df = {0; 0.76; 0.24; 0; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0; 0.76; 0; 0} 
 Seller agent second counter offer rate is 0.836 
 
 Incoming Offer received from SA ($3199); at this price BA: 
 Satisfaction Degree is: SD = 49.7% 
 Df = 0.155 
 Linguistic variables for SD = {0; 0.012; 0.988; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variables for Df = {0.29; 0.71; 0; 0; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0.852; 0.7015; 0; 0} 








Fuzzy Linguistic variables 
 Incoming Offer received from BA ($1975). At this price: 
 Satisfaction degree of Seller agent; SD = 43.3% 
 Df = 0.57 
 Linguistic variable for SD = {0; 0.433; 0.567; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variable for Df = {0; 0; 0.722; 0.278; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0.312; 0.409; 0; 0} 
 Seller agent first counter offer ratio is 0.713. 
 
 Incoming Offer received from SA ($3208.5); so at this price BA: 
 Satisfaction Degree is : SD = 48.1% 
 Df = 0.3844 
 Linguistic variables for SD = {0; 0.475; 0.535; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variables for Df = {0; 0.482; 0.518; 0; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0.228; .277; 0; 0} 
 Buyer agent second counter offer rate is 0.411. 
 
 Incoming Offer received from BA ($2617); at this price SA: 
 Satisfaction Degree is: SD = 50% 
 Df = 0.131 
 Linguistic variables for SD ={0; 0; 1; 0; 0} 
 Linguistic variables for Df = {0; 0.35; 0.65; 0; 0} 
 Concession rate C = {0; 0; 0.65; 0; 0} 




Table 1B: Satisfaction degree scenario I vs. satisfaction degree scenario II 
 
Price Quality Warranty Satisfaction 
Degree SC I 
Satisfaction 
Degree SC II 
$4700 0 1 8% 8% 
4500 0 1 8.11% 8.16% 
4300 0 1 8.34% 8.86% 
4100 0 1 8.66% 15.3% 
3900 0 1 8.71% 19.6% 
3700 0 1 8.78% 20.3% 
3500 0 1 8.86% 22.7% 
3300 0 1 8.92% 23.01% 
3100 0 1 8.97% 23.7% 
2900 0 1 9.07% 24.8% 
2700 0 1 9.18% 25.3% 
2500 0 1 13.7% 25% 
2300 0 1 16.8% 25% 
2100 0 1 19.1% 25% 
1900 0 1 20.9% 25% 
1700 0 1 22.2% 25% 









Quality Warranty Satisfaction 
Degree SC I 
Satisfactio
n Degree SC II 
800 0 1 25% 26.9% 
800 1 1 25% 28.7% 
800 1.2 1 25.3% 30.3% 
800 1.4 1 25.7% 31.9% 
800 1.6 1 26.4% 33.5% 
800 1.8 1 27.1% 35% 
800 2 1 29.08% 36.6% 
800 2.2 1 30.1% 38.2% 
800 2.4 1 30.3% 39.7% 
800 2.6 1 30.5% 41.3% 
800 2.8 1 30.6% 42.8% 
800 3 1 32.2% 44.4% 
800 3.2 1 33% 46.1% 
800 3.4 1 33% 47.9% 
800 3.6 1 45% 49.7% 
800 3.8 1 47.7% 58.8% 
800 4 1 50% 59.2% 
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800 4.2 1 50% 63.3% 
800 5 1 50% 68.8% 
800 7 1 63% 84.7%% 
800 9 1 75% 91.5%% 
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